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I. INTRODUCTION

The law is at heart a descriptive exercise. We attempt to pin down all-too
elusive concepts of action and consequence in formulations of words. We are
not alone in this kind of activity. Indeed, the very words we seek to use, as
we commit law to writing, depend on the descriptive work of another branch
of learning: they depend on spelling.
Now whatever may or may not be the problems with the legal system in
the United States, we in the law can take some comfort from the manifest
failings of the spelling of the English language in which most of our laws are
written. Spelling is a very troublesome thing for English speakers. There is no
reliable correspondence between the sounds pronounced and the letters used
to represent them. An extreme example of the problem is George Bernard
Shaw's suggestion that "ghoti" is a perfectly plausible English spelling for the
word more normally spelled "fish": "gh" as in enough; "o" as in women, and
"ti" as in notion.' Of course, "ghoti" has the advantage over "xqlap" as being
a justifiable spelling for the aquatic animal. "Xqlap" is outright wrong.
"Ghoti" is at least possible, even though it is subject to considerable
misinterpretation, requires significant explanation, and, on the whole, is
nowhere near as good as "fish."

1. For a discussion of Shaw's obsession with improving the English alphabet and of the
litigation which stymied his post-mortem attempt to work on the problem, see JESSE DUKEMINIER
& STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 607 (5th ed. 1995); see also Roger
D. Colton, The Use of Canonsof Statutory Construction:A CaseStudy from Iowa or When Does
"GHOTI" Spell "FISH"?,5 SETON HALL LEGIS. J., 149, 149 (1982) (applying this metaphor to
problems of statutory construction).
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How does English spelling have the potential to get so confused? Perhaps
it is an accumulation of historical accident, change in the underlying speech
being described, and outmoded conventions which no one has the authority to
sort out and bring up to date. 2 The French are not so handicapped. They have
appointed a central body to oversee the French language-the Academie
Frangais. 3 This self-consciously august institution has been charged with
overseeing the development of French, and has from time to time standardized
spelling through the publication of the Dictionnairede l'Academie.4 Indeed,
the ninth edition of this work has been in preparation since 1935; completion
is hoped for by the end of the century.'
A. The Role of the ALl
Whatever our lack in America in the realm of a broadly-recognized
arbiter of spelling, we have just such an arbiter of law: The American Law
Institute. The ALI, as it is widely known, came into existence in 1923.6 A
committee of the best and the brightest of the day, called "The Committee on
the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the
Law," had been convened at the instigation of the Association of American
Law Schools. 7 Committee members included such luminaries as Elihu Root
(Chairman), Benjamin N. Cardozo, Arthur L. Corbin, Learned Hand, William
Draper Lewis (Secretary), Roscoe Pound, John H. Wigmore and Samuel
Williston.'
The problem identified by the Committee has a perennial quality to it,
although the added concern with class struggle and radical sedition gives it a
dated flavor:
There is today general dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.
The feeling of dissatisfaction is not confined to that radical section of the

2. For a discussion of the failure to establish such an authoritative academy in England and
the United States, and of the resistance to linguistic standardization generally, see Juan F. Perea,
Demography and Distrust:An Essay on American Languages, CulturalPluralism, and Official
English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269 (1992).
3. DICTIONNAIRE HISTORIQUE DE L'ORTHOGRAPHE FRANCAISE XIV-Xv (Nina Catach ed.,
1995).
4. 1 NINA CATACH, ET AL., OTHOGRAPHE ET LEXICOGRAPHIE 13 (1971).

5. Joseph Harriss, Qu'est-ce que c'est? A Social Club or a CulturalBastion? Academie
Franpais,SMITHSONIAN, January 1990 at 144, 152.
6. The key documents relating to the founding of the ALI are reprinted in THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE 50TH ANNIVERSARY (ALI ed., 1973) [hereinafter ALI 50TH].
7. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT ORGANIZATION
FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAW PROPOSING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AMERICAN LAW

INSTITUTE, [hereinafter THE 1923 REPORT], reprinted in ALl 50TH, supra note 6, at 12.

8. Id. at5.
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community which would overthrow existing social, economic and political
institutions. If it were, we as lawyers could afford to ignore it. But the
opinion that the law is unnecessarily uncertain and complex, that many of
its rules do not work well in practice, and that its administration often
results not in justice, but in injustice, is general among all classes and
among persons of widely divergent political and social opinions. 9
How had this sorry state come about? "Two chief defects in American
Law are its uncertainty and complexity."" Returning to the original premise,
the report stated:
Perhaps, however, the most serious result of these defects is that they
create a lack of respect for law. Their effect is the same as the effect of
clear, certain but unjust law, and for the same reason; law to perform its
functions must be adapted to the needs of life, and no such need was ever
satisfied by uncertain and complex rules ....
In our opinion the most
important task that the bar can undertake is to reduce the amount of the
uncertainty and complexity of the law. It is essential if an adequate
administration of justice is to be had that lawyers awaken to the extent to
which the law should be and may be simplified and clarified."
The primary means to accomplishing this was to be a new kind of legal
reference: "We are convinced therefore that the specific work which any
organization created by the legal profession to improve the law should
undertake on its formation is the production of such a 'Restatement of the
Law.'" 12
In addition to providing clarity and simplicity, the Restatements of the
Law could also bring the substance of the law up to date.
We speak of the work which the organization should undertake as a
restatement; its object should not only be to help make certain much that
is now uncertain and to simplify unnecessary complexities, but also to
promote those changes which will tend better to adapt the laws to the
3
needs of life.'
The preparation of these Restatements was to be the work of the American
Law Institute.' 4

9. Id. at 11.
10. Id. at 15.
11. Id.at 16.
12. THE 1923
13. Id.
14. Id.at 42.

REPORT,

supra note 7, at 21.
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The ALI was incorporated the very same day that the 1923 Report was
presented. Among its seven incorporators were the then serving Chief Justice
of the United States Supreme Court, William Howard Taft, and one of his
successors, Charles E. Hughes. 5 The Certificate of Incorporation reflected
the role laid down in the 1923 report: "The particular business and objects of
the society are educational, and are to promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better
administration of justice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and
scientific legal work." 6 This language continues in force, and remains the
stated goals of the ALI.
The formation of the ALI marks a general triumph of the "Langdellian"
approach to the law in America. Certainly the mention of "scientific legal
work" echoes Langdell's famous assertion "that the law is a science." 17 The
premise is that by careful thought and analysis of the cases and statutes,
underlying principles of law can be extracted and formulated into satisfactory
rules of general applicability. This exercise is so familiar to most United States
lawyers as to appear inevitable: it is, after all, the basic skill taught through
the traditional "Langdellian" case method, a skill beaten into most of us, with
greater or lesser painfulness, in law school.'" Langdell's own work along this
line included helping to define the very existence of a law of contracts.' 9
"Courts had, of course, been deciding cases about contracts ever since there
had been courts. But the idea that there was such a thing as a general law-or
theory-of contract seems never to occurred to the legal mind until Langdell
somehow stumbled across it."'2
The Restatements have remained the pinnacle of this process of deliberative synthesis, so much so that they themselves take on the weight of binding
authority, displacing the earlier material from which they have drawn their
conclusions. Through this feedback loop, the law indeed becomes that which
the case-reasoning method, practiced by the leading experts in the field, says

15. Id. at
16. ALl,

107.
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S ANNUAL REPORTS, SEVENTY-SECOND ANNUAL

MEETING 57

(1995).

17. C. C. Langdell, Note, Teaching Law as a Science, 21 AM. L. REV. 123, 124 (1887).
18. See generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL: THE INFLUENCE OF HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL ch. 2 (1978) (discussing the evolution of modem legal education); ROBERT STEVENS,
LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s 52-53 (1983)
(discussing Langdell's development of the case book method for legal instruction). For a
discussion of the relationship between legal education and the process of developing a clarified
and simplified body of legal doctrine, see TERRENCE C. HALLIDAY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE
RATIONALIZATION OF LAW: A TALE OF Two COUNTRIES-THE UNITED STATES AND
AUSTRALIA, American Bar Foundation Working Paper No. 8711 (1982).

19. See C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1880).
20. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 6 (1974).
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it ought to be. The chaos of the common law is tamed, and order and
enlightenment reign with clarity and simplicity-or so the myth goes.
The purpose of this article is not to praise or criticize this process. Others
have taken sides in the debate, 2 and pursuing it in adequate detail would
require reliving much of the jurisprudential thought of this century. There is
only room for one historical excursion in this article, and that excursion will
be devoted to publicity itself. Rather, the mission of the ALI, in all its selfappointed glory, will be taken as a given. My goal instead will be to evaluate
just how well the various scholars working under the banner of the ALI have
performed their declared task with respect to a particular comer of doctrine:
the right of publicity. Have they gotten to "fish" yet?
B. Restating Publicity
Prior to publication of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
(Restatement)' in 1995, the ALI had not previously addressed publicity as
a separate doctrine in a Restatement. Now publicity has received four sections
of its own. How did the ALI do? The exercise is welcomed, but it is by no
means completely successful. While it represents a useful step toward a
coherent body of rules for publicity, significant, unsolved problems remain.
The opportunity for a real exercise in clarification and simplification has been
missed.
Perhaps one shouldn't hope for too much. The very presence of the right
of publicity in a Restatement demonstrates just how far a doctrine can come
in a relatively short time. After all, publicity's first public appearance as an
articulated right came in 1953, in an opinion authored by the noted federal
appeals court judge and realist scholar,' Jerome Frank, in Haelan Laboratoties, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.24 Frank's bold exercise of activist
jurisprudence enabled the law to circumvent limitations which had already
begun to encrust the right of privacy, which itself at the time could claim less
than fifty years of judicially recognized existence. When Frank made his leap
to publicity in Haelan, it threw the whole field of rights in a person's identity
into considerable turmoil. One court, trying to sort things out in 1956 in light
of the Haelan decision, concluded with some exasperation: "The state of the
law is still that of a haystack in a hurricane .

. .

.

"25

Since then, a number

21. For a passionate attack on the ALI by a federal judge, see Paul A. Simmons, Government
by an UnaccountablePrivateNon Profit Corporation, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 67 (1992).
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1993) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
23. This was a label he initially adopted for himself but eventually came to reject. JEROME
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND vii (1949).

24. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
25. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 926 (1956).
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of America's leading legal scholars and some of its best judges have taken a
shot at clarifying the field, with varying degrees of success.
Cumulatively, significant progress has been made in the job of sorting
through the tangled pile of thought, and this progress is largely reflected in the
new Restatement sections. That is the good news. The bad news is that there
are still lingering areas of muddle and confusion in the doctrine of publicity,
and the Restatement often reflects these as well. Returning to the spelling
metaphor, the Restatement does get us past "xqlap," but perhaps only as far
as "ghoti." It is to be hoped that courts and legislatures, in reaching for a
clear formulation of rights in this area, will be able to sort out the strengths
and weaknesses of the Restatement's position. For if future lawmakers,
whether in the statehouse or the courthouse, become blinded by the good work
of the ALI on the right of publicity, they will overlook the continuing
problems, slowing the search for an even better formulation of the law of
identity.
So, just what has the ALI done to deserve this faint praise? There are four
Restatement sections on publicity. The first two, sections 46 and 47, are the
most interesting and will receive the most attention in this article. Together
they define the coverage of the right of publicity. The general rule is
introduced in section 46, entitled "Appropriation of the Commercial Value of
a Person's Identity: The Right of Publicity." It reads: "One who appropriates
the commercial value of a person's identity by using without consent the
person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is
subject to liability for the relief appropriate under the rules stated in [sections] 48 and 49.26

What constitutes a use for the purpose of trade receives separate treatment
in section 47, entitled "Uses for Purposes of Trade:"
The name, likeness, and other indicia of a person's identity are used "for
purposes of trade" under the rule stated in [section] 46 if they are used in
advertising the user's goods or services, or are placed on merchandise
marketed by the user, or are used in connection with services rendered by
the user. However, use "for purposes of trade" does not ordinarily include
the use of a person's identity in news reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental to
such uses.27

The latter two sections on publicity, sections 48 and 49, deal with remedies.
Both contain a large number of non-exclusive and quite general factors to be
weighed in an unquantifiable balancing test to be used in deciding what

26. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 46.
27. Id. § 47.
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remedies are appropriate. Both sections 48 and 49 are so platitudinous,
obvious and subjective as to deserve relatively little discussion.
In order to understand the nature of the Restatement's successes and
failures, it is necessary to review both the societal context and the doctrinal
history that shaped the formulations of publicity from which the Restatement
authors started. Therefore, this article will first review the value of persona in
our society, seeking useful categories for the ways in which attributes of
identity are used. It will then present a history of the emergence of the right
of publicity, a history that requires some detail in the telling. Much of the
lingering confusion in the right derives from the definitional accidents of
publicity's birth and development. Against this background, the new
Restatement sections will be evaluated: how good is the work? Finally, I will
suggest a somewhat different synthesis, an alternative Restatement, as it were,
together with some specific suggestions for legislatures, courts, and commentators as they take the next steps in the development of the law of publicity
within the context of a larger law dealing with attributes of identity.
II. SOCIETAL BACKGROUND: THE VALUE OF PERSONA
The value of persona in our society has been fueled by economic and
technological developments. 2" Among the many new phenomena sparked by
28. The history and arguments presented here are built in large part from materials prepared
by others who have worked in this field such as RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF TORTS] and J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY
AND PRIVACY (1995). These two works will receive detailed discussion. Among the most helpful
general resources are SHELDON W. HALPERN, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY
AND "MORAL RIGHTS" (1988); Frank G. Houdek, Researchingthe Right of Publicity:A Revised
and ComprehensiveBibliographyofLaw-Related Materials, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
385 (1994); Lisa A. Lawrence, The Right of Publicity:A Research Guide, 10 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 143 (1987). Important articles on the subject which have themselves figured in the
development of the right include Harold R. Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness,
Personality and History, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 553 (1960); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of
Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL L.
REV. 383 (1960); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REV. 193 (1890). Among recent treatments which have taken a broader view are ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY (1995); Randall P. Bezanson, The Right
to PrivacyRevisited: Privacy, News and Social Change, 1890-1990, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1133
(1992); Sheldon W. Halpem, The Right ofPublicity: CommercialExploitationof the Associative
Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199 (1986). The one-hundredth anniversary in 1990
of the Warren and Brandeis article led to a spate of articles and symposia, including those
published in 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643-928 (1991) and 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 387-542
(1990).
For an interesting treatment of publicity from a somewhat non-traditional economic
perspective, see Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and
PublicityRights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125 (1993). A more traditional economic analysis of the right
appears in Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA ENT.
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the technical developments of the nineteenth century were the popular press
and mass advertising. For some time, there had been newspapers, often limited
to a particular political faction, and there had been the use of famous people's
identities in naming inns and the like. With the spread of literacy and advances
in mass printing technology, however, the scale of these activities changed
dramatically. A new kind of newspaper came into being: one which focused
less and less on inside political news and more and more on sensationalism,
gossip, and crusading populism. In the United States, milestones in this
process included Horace Greeley's founding of the New York Tribune in 1841,
Joseph Pulitzer's acquisition of the New York World in 1883, and William
Randolph Hearst's take-over of the New York Journal in 1895. Circulations
exploded and newspapers multiplied, fueled in part by the advertising revenue
from an equally explosive national economy.29 As the source of goods moved
from local, often personally known, manufacturers, to large companies with
regional or even national distribution, mass advertising became the prime tool
for introducing products to consumers.30
In order to be effective, both news and advertising need to attract and
hold the interest and attention of people. They must, therefore, focus on the
subjects that most interest humans. Chief among these are other humans.
People, their faces, histories, and identities, captivate the interest of other
people in ways that can be turned to commercial advantage and have economic
value. While celebrities are of particular use in this way, the previously
unknown have value as well. By the close of the nineteenth century, the
identity of people, elements of their persona, and details about their lives had
become widely usable, and therefore increasingly valuable, economic elements
in both news and advertising. As one commentator wrote in 1890: "In all this,
the advent of the newspaper, or rather a particular class of newspaper, has

L. REV. 97 (1994). Madow is critical of the very existence of a publicity right. While he raises
some interesting questions, there is a certain "if pigs could fly" counter-factuality to his
arguments which ultimately renders them largely irrelevant to the actual development of the right,
and so they will not be discussed here. A response to many of his arguments will appear in this
author's PRIVACY AND PUBLICITY: SOCIETY, DOCTRINE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW. For

the purpose of this article the justifications both for the publicity right and for the free speech
factors which constrain it will be taken as generally accepted.
29. Newspaper, 8 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, (15th ed. 1992) 661, 662. For a
further description of the growth of the popular press, see DON R. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE
PRESS, THE LAW, THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 10-15 (1972); James H.
Barron, Warrenand Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890): Demystifying
a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 875, 888-891 (1979); Ken Gormly, One Hundred
Years of Privacy, 1992 WIsc. L. REV. 1335, 1350 (1992). For a discussion of the emergence of
the "celebrity," see Madow, supra note 28 at 148-167.
30. For a description of the growth of personality-based advertising, see George M.
Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of Celebrity: Persona as Property, 51 LA. L. REV. 443, 457
(1991).
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made a great change. It has converted
gossip into a marketable commodity."31 If the mass reproduction and distribution of print and picture were the
big media developments of the nineteenth century, the mass reproduction and
distribution of sound and moving pictures have been the big developments of
the twentieth century.32 These developments have further fueled the massive
rise in the value of human identity. One recent study notes:
Character merchandising is by no means a new science. The practice
began way back in the nineteenth century, and indeed there are examples
where Queen Victoria herself was used to endorse either one product or
another. However, from its crude beginnings, the technique has developed
tremendously and is no longer simply concerned with slapping the face of
a top dignitary onto the product. Character merchandising is now rated as
one of the most powerful weapons in the marketeer's armory .... 33
Throughout the twentieth century, the uses-and value-of a person's identity
in the news, in fiction, in advertising, merchandising and the mass media
generally, have only continued to grow. As one court recognized: "Television
and other media create marketable celebrity identity value. Considerable
energy and ingenuity are expended by those who have achieved celebrity value
to exploit it for profit. 34 The value can be transferred by association.
A successful individual, such as an athlete, opera star, or media or
sporting personality, has a valuable asset in his name and reputation, which
is marketable in connection with products, and sometimes with services.
The value depends on the public perception of the personality, and how
35
established he has become in the "recognition factor" stakes.
Curtis Management, Inc., a company located in Indianapolis, Indiana,
squeezes $125 million a year out of the publicity value of some 200 celebrities.36 Famous people are not the only source of images useful to the media,
advertising, and marketing worlds. As several of the cases discussed in this
study will show, completely unknown individuals can be thrust into the public
eye, bringing value in the process.

31. PEMBER, supranote 29, at 16 (quoting E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen, IV To His
Own Reputation, SCRIBNER'S MAGAZINE, July 1890 at 67).
32. For a description of the growth of these media, and in particular television, see HOWARD
BLUMENTHAL & OLIVER R. GOODENOUGH, THIS BUSINESS OF TELEVISION xiii-xxiii
33. STEPHEN NOAKES & NICK TATE, CHARACTER MERCHANDISING 3 (1987).

(1991).

34. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied,
989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
35. RICHARD BAGEHOT & GRAEME NUTALL, SPONSORSHIP, ENDORSEMENT & MERCHANDISING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 130 (1990).

36. Jeff Barge, DeceasedStars Haunting the Courtroom, A.B.A. J., May 1995, at 33.
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A. Categorizing the Uses of Persona:Distinctions Useful and Confusing
While the ways of turning humanity's innate fascination with personal
identity to account are probably bounded only by humanity's ingenuity,37 five
principal modes of use can be fruitfully isolated as encompassing most of the
current activity in the market place of the persona: (1) informational use,
(2) creative use, (3) advertising use, (4) icon use, and (5) performance use.
The first four are common to all of the modes of mass media; the fifth depends
to a large degree on the electronic media born in the twentieth century.
Informational use involves the communication of purportedly factual
information about a person to a wider audience. Implicit in this statement is
a concern that the information so transmitted be in fact accurate. News is the
classic case of such use, but history, biography, and other non-fictional
presentations also fall into the informational category.
Creative use also involves the communication of information-but there
is no longer the goal of factual accuracy. Rather, such use involves the
construction of an admittedly fictional world of some kind. The inhabitants of
this world, however, may be identifiably real people. Sometimes the fictional
world containing recognizable people can aspire to a kind of hyper-reality,
showing essential truths which might lie hidden in a more prosaically accurate
depiction of the world. Sometimes the fictional world may be intentionally
counterfactual, making some comment by contrast, through satire or lampoon.
Often it seeks only to provide an escape from reality, rather than greater
insight into it. Whatever the goal, all such worlds, to be at all intelligible to
human readers, must draw to a greater or lesser extent on the world that
actually exists and thus, to some extent, on the attributes and identification of
actual people. As Justice Story, early in the history of the United States,
summed up a similar point in copyright law:
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few,
if any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original
throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must
necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used
before."8
The third use of personality, advertising, involves helping to sell products
and services which are not themselves elements of the personality in question.
This can involve endorsement: many people can be convinced to buy
something which a familiar and respected figure actually or apparently uses
herself. But endorsement is only the start of this kind of use. Almost any kind

37. See White, 971 F.2d at 1398.
38. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (D. Mass. 1845).
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of association with a venerated person can be helpful in sales, even if only to
draw the attention of prospective buyers to the actual sales message. Professor
McCarthy suggests an extreme example of this negated endorsement: "Famous
football quarterback Ira Idaho may be the best in the league, but he has never
tasted Double D beer. Why don't you?"39 This outright admission that the
person depicted is completely unaware of, let alone unassociated with, the
product in question, is based on an actual ad which ran in England. A
billboard sized picture of Ronald Reagan drew attention to an ad for Mansfield
Beer, even though it admitted Reagan had never tasted the stuff.40 Nor are
celebrities the only source of power in this kind of image use. Otherwise
anonymous people can provide images of value to wrap around products and
services to draw attention and good associations to them.
Fourth, there is the trade in items where the thing of value being used is
the persona itself. This icon use is clearest in the sale of pictures, figurines,
and other pure representations of the person venerated. It also underlies the
sale of T-shirts, lunch boxes, and other utilitarian items which bear the
likeness of the venerated or desirable person. Eventually such a use can
overlap into advertising, but there is enough clarity in the core difference to
provide a usefully separate category.
Finally, there is the use of a person's identity as a performer, whether in
her own right, as with a well-known singer or athlete, or as an actor
portraying the role of another. Concerns over this use are the product of the
electronic media. In the days when performance was of necessity live, the
question of consent to the use of a performance was largely answered by the
agreement to go on the stage or the playing field at all. Now performances,
whether recorded and replayed, or transmitted live, can reach a national or
international audience. The complexities of consent have increased considerably.
These five categories offer fruitful lines of demarcation. Another
distinction, made by many statutes, courts and commentators, has been less
helpful. This category revolves around words and phrases such as "commercial" or "for the purposes of trade." Such terms always need careful
qualification and explaination when applied to any of the foregoing use
categories in a medium of mass communication. All of these uses can be, and
in the relentlessly for-profit world of America generally are, carried on as
commercial activities, for the purposes of trade. 4 For instance, the decision
of a popular news magazine to put Princess Diana or O.J. Simpson on the
cover is very much influenced by the fact that such a picture will generally
boost circulation. Indeed, if this journal were brought out by a popular

39. McCARTHY, supra note 28, § 5.4[A].
40. Id. at Fig. 5-2.
41. See MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 7.1[B].
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publisher, it would not be surprising for it to have a montage cover showing
the Princess paired with Clint Eastwood, for reasons that will become clear
later in this article. A set of distinctions which uses terms in such frequent
conflict with their commonly understood meanings could probably use further
clarification and simplification.
III. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND I: THE DISCOVERY OF PRIVACY
A. The Warren and BrandeisArticle
The best starting point for a history of the right of publicity, and the law
of identity more generally, is an 1890 article in the Harvard Law Review
entitled The Right to Privacy.42 It was written by two formidable legal minds,
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. At the time the two were partners in a
Boston law firm, and they had been first and second in the Harvard Law
School class of 1877. 43
Much myth has grown up around the inspiration for the article. The
wedding of Warren's daughter, the story went, caused a frenzy of press
attention which greatly annoyed Warren and inspired the article. 4 All of this
has been convincingly disproved, not the least because Warren's daughter was
no more than seven years old when the article was written.45 Whatever the
circumstance, there is a passion in the rhetoric which supports the idea of a
personal experience with journalism at its most ravenous:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and
of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as
well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations
are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy the
indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be
procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle.... Each crop of
unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the seed of more, and, in direct
proportion to its circulation, results in a lowering of social standards and
of morality .... Easy of comprehension, appealing to that weak side of
human nature which is never wholly cast down by the misfortunes and
frailties of our neighbors, no one can be surprised that it usurps the place
42. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 28. There were of course antecedents to the Warren and
Brandeis article, both in cases and commentary. See Barron, supra note 29, at 884-888, 922.
Nevertheless, the ground-breaking effect of the article cannot be denied.
43. MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 1.3[B]; Barron, supra note 29, at 909; Prosser, supra note
28, at 383.
44. This tale was promoted by no less prominent a legal scholar than William L. Prosser. See
Prosser, supra note 28, at 383.
45. See Barron, supra note 29, at 893.
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of interest in brains capable of other things. Triviality destroys at once
robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling. No enthusiasm can flourish,
no generous impulse can survive under its blighting influence.46
The British Royal Family probably feels that little has changed since 1890.
Importantly, the focus of the Warren and Brandeis proposal is clearly on
the informational uses of personality. In keeping with this, the harm they
supposed is not economic, but related rather to reputation and "delicacy of
feeling." This approach had critical consequences for how they articulated
their formulation of rights in identity. Warren and Brandeis argued that the
right to prevent these supposed abuses already existed in the common law. The
article derived the principle of "the right 'to be let alone'"' largely from
property law, citing a line of mostly British cases. 48 But Warren and Brandeis
ultimately discarded the property model, in part because of theoretical
concerns over the nature of a right whose very justification is to prevent
exploitation,49 in part to avoid unfavorable precedents, 50 but perhaps most
importantly because Warren and Brandeis felt that non-economic, feelingrelated harm underlay a right targeted at informational uses, where the law had
traditionally shied away from property concepts.l
We must therefore conclude that the rights, so protected, whatever
their exact nature, are not rights arising from contract or from special
trust, but are rights as against the world; and, as above stated, the
principle which has been applied to protect these rights is in reality not the
principle of private property, unless that word be used in an extended and
unusual sense. The principle which protects personal writings and any
other productions of the intellect or of the emotions, is the right to
privacy, and the law has no new principle to formulate when it extends this
protection to the personal appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal
relation, domestic or otherwise. 2
Warren and Brandeis were not entirely consistent in jettisoning a property
rationale. Their opening remarks were, "That the individual shall have full
protection in person and in property is a principle as old as the common

46. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 28, at 196.
47. Id. at 195 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON ToRTs (2d ed. 1888)).

48. Id. at 201-12.
49. Id. at 200-01 ("But where the value of the production is found not in the right to take the
profits arising from publication, but in the peace of mind or the relief afforded by the ability to
prevent any publication at all, it is difficult to regard the right as one of property .. .
50. Id. at 202-04.
51. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 28, at 205.
52. Id. at 213.
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I5and many of their citations were to cases that used a property

rationale. 54 But while it starts with property notions, the article finishes with
the focus on yellow journalism, improper revelation of information, hurt
feelings, and the right to be left alone. 5 The ideas that "hurt feelings" were
a prerequisite for protecting use of the persona and that the interests protected
were not "property" profoundly shaped the initial development of the law
governing rights in personal attributes. Like an outmoded or irregular spelling,
a cogently articulated paradigm has its own durability in the law, even when
it is a rather imperfect reflection of the unarticulated promptings of felt justice
which it is used to describe.
B. The Trap of an InappropriateParadigm
In creating new rights and duties, the law articulates rules of conduct in
abstract terms, often attaching them to existing paradigms of explanation and
definition. Unfortunately, these borrowings, like hand-me-down clothes, do not
always fit as well as they might, particularly as the law grows. The borrowed
definitions, rationales, and other attributes that seem to suit a legal principle
in its youth can have unforeseen-and often negative-results as the realities
with which the law is dealing develop and change.
There are, however, strong forces in the law that protect established
paradigms from being modified or discarded. Holmes charted the glacial
evolution which occurs in law and the tremendous durability of annunciated
rules:
The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or
formula. In the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity
disappears, but the rule remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule
has been forgotten, and ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how it

is to be accounted for. Some ground of policy is thought of, which seems
to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of things; and then
the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have been found for it, and
enters on a new career. The old form receives a new content, and in time
even the form modifies itself to fit the meaning it has received.56
Recognizing these tendencies, one contemporary writer has compared the
development of intellectual property law to the panda's thumb: an evolutionary

53. Id. at 193 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 202-11.
55. Id. at 214-20. A useful discussion of the Warren and Brandeis article from the standpoint

of the choice between tort and property theories appears in Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren
and Brandeis: Privacy, Property and Appropriation,41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647 (1991).
56. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 5 (1881).
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development containing limitations which "stem from its remote accidental
origins. "7 The tort model proved just such a limiting start for privacy, so
limiting in fact that it proved easier to "discover" a different paradigm-publicity-to deal with the new wrinkles, than to reshape the original.
Benjamin Cardozo, while sitting on New York's highest court, wrote:
"Metaphors in the law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to
liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it. "" In the law, as in gardening
and child-rearing, as the twig is bent so grows the tree. Paradigms not only
empower, they also entrap.
C. Roberson: Privacy'sFirstMajor Test
Over ten years passed before the Warren-Brandeis privacy rule was
significantly tested in the courts, first in New York and then in Georgia.5 9
The first of these cases arose in New York State, and was decided by a closely
divided Court of Appeals in 1902.60 It involved the tribulations of Abigail
Roberson, an attractive young woman whose face had been featured on widely
distributed posters for a flour manufacturer paired with the slogan "Flour of
the Family." The problem was that Ms. Roberson had never agreed to this
classic advertising use-her face had been pirated. According to her pleadings,
she became the object of ridicule among her acquaintances. Sickened with
mortification and shame, she took to her bed and pined. She also sued, basing
her claim upon the right of privacy as advanced by Warren and Brandeis. 61
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Alton B. Parker allowed that the
Warren and Brandeis article was "clever," 62 but rejected its conclusions.
Taking the article's sweeping scope and anti-press, information-controlling
pronouncements as the necessary baggage of privacy, Justice Parker feared
that to recognize such a right would open wide Pandora's box: "I have gone
only far enough to barely suggest the vast field of litigation which would
necessarily be opened up should this court hold that privacy exists as a legal

57. Paul A. David, Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda's Thumb: Patents,
Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 19, 22 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein
et. al.eds., 1993).
58. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
59. The interim cases in and around the privacy right are discussed in Armstrong, supra note
30, at 454-455, and are cited in the New York and Georgia cases discussed below: Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.,
50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
60. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 443.
61. Id. at 442-43.
62. Id. at 444.
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right enforceable in equity by injunction, and by damages where they seem
necessary to give complete relief."63
Justice Parker was not wholly unsympathetic to Ms. Roberson's
predicament. Nonetheless, the scope of the Warren-Brandeis privacy
right-explicitly targeted as it was to information uses-frightened him, and
he was unprepared to act judicially.
[W]hile justice in a given case may be worked out by a decision of the
court according to the notions of right which govern the individual judge
or body of judges comprising the court, the mischief which will finally
result may be almost incalculable under our system, which makes a
decision in one case a precedent64for decisions in all future cases which are
akin to it in the essential facts.
Rather, in a pattern familiar in such circumstances, he invited the legislature
to act, and try to put the first spot on the canvas:
The legislative body could very well interfere and arbitrarily provide
that no one should be permitted for his own selfish purpose to use the
picture or the name of another for advertising purposes without his
consent. In such event no embarrassment would result to the general body
of the law, for the rule would be applicable only to cases provided for by
the statute. The courts, however, being without authority to legislate, are
required to decide cases upon principle, and so are necessarily embarrassed
by precedents created by an extreme, and therefore unjustifiable application of an old principle.6
Note that the invitation to the legislature is to act to limit advertising uses of
the kind in fact at issue in this case, and not the informationaluses on which
Warren and Brandeis had focused. Indeed, part of what made the case
inherently appealing was the lack of any informational value in the use of Ms.
Roberson's face.
The invited legislative sequel occurred in 1903, when New York State
enacted a statutory "Right of Privacy"' aimed directly at the facts of the
Roberson case and, on its face, dealing only with advertising, and perhaps
icon, uses of identity. This right now appears at sections 50 and 51 of the New
York Civil Rights Law. 67 Section 50, entitled "Right of Privacy," is a
criminal statute providing:

63. Id. at 443.
64. Id. at 444.
65. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 443.

66. 1903 N.Y. Laws ch. 132, §§ 1-2.
67. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50-51 (MeKinney 1992).
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A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for
the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person
without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or68 if a
minor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
As a "common law" style pronouncement of general principle, section 50
is a fairly typical example. Section 51 provides a civil action for violations of
the right, and authorizes injunctions and damages, including exemplary
damages for knowing violations, as relief. By a process of accretion over the
years, section 51 has come to contain some specifically tailored provisions one
might expect in a statutory approach, such as exceptions for photo-shop
advertising windows and for the display of photos of the author of a play at
the theater.69 In 1995, the New York legislature further amended section 51,
adding the voice as a protected category.70
D. The Roberson Dissent
There was a vigorous dissent in Roberson, written by Judge John C.
Gray. He maintained: "That the individual has a right to privacy, which he
can enforce, and which equity will protect against the invasion of, is a
proposition which is not opposed by any decision in this court, and which, in
my opinion, is within the field of accepted legal principles." 7'
In arguing for Ms. Roberson's claim, Judge Gray asserted that she met
the classic mental distress requirements of the Warren-Brandeis approach. He
detailed the unwanted public exposure which the poster had brought on her:
We are bound to assume, and I find no difficulty in doing so, that the
conspicuous display of her likeness in various public places has so
humiliated her by the notoriety and by the public comments it has
provoked as to cause her distress and suffering in body and mind, and to
confine her to her bed with illness. 72
But Judge Gray's opinion also used the language of property in discussing
Ms. Roberson's claim. Concluding that the property approach had been too
readily dismissed by Chief Justice Parker, he wrote:
I think that [the approach of the majority] is unduly restricted... by a
search for some property which has been invaded by the defendants' acts.

68. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1992).
69. Id. § 51.
70. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
71. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 449 (Gray, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
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Property is not, necessarily, the thing itself which is owned; it is the right

of the owner in relation to it. The right to be protected in one's possession
of a thing or in one's privileges, belonging to him as an individual, or
secured to him as a member of the commonwealth, is property, and as
such entitled to the protection of the law. 73

He also indicated that intellectual property models existed and could be
borrowed:
I think that this plaintiff has the same property in the right to be protected
against the use of her face for defendant's commercial purposes as she
would have if they were publishing her literary compositions. The right
would be conceded if she had sat for her photograph; but if her face or her
portraiture has a value, the value is hers exclusively, until the use be
granted away to the public. Any other principle of decision, in my opinion,
is as repugnant to equity as it is shocking to reason. 74
The development of the law of privacy might have been quite different if
the Roberson dissent, with its melding of property and personal dignity
concepts, had been the majority. This difference would have opened up the
scavenger hunt for a satisfactory articulation of the right to a different set of
possible attributes-attributes that might have had an easier time in letting the
courts adapt themselves to new conditions and grant relief against injuries
made possible by the inventions and changing conditions of society. Although
the Roberson dissent was extensively quoted by the majority in the next
important right of privacy case, Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 5
property aspects were not included as part of the argument and died as the law
developed. 76
E. Pavesich
Paolo Pavesich was an artist, living in relative obscurity, who suddenly
found a picture of himself smiling out of a life insurance ad. The advertisement compared two photographs. One showed the happy, robust, but unnamed
Mr. Pavesich, who, it stated, had thought to buy life insurance in good time.
The other showed a decrepit and downcast person who had not and was now
uninsurable. But Mr. Pavesich had never bought insurance from the company
in question. The photographic negative was obtained from the photographer
without Mr. Pavesich's consent. He sued, alleging both a violation of the right

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 450.
Id.
50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
See Gordon, supra note 28, at 558.
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of privacy and defamation. 77 The case was eventually heard by the Supreme
Court of Georgia. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Andrew J. Cobb
squarely tackled the right of privacy question, even though he eventually
granted relief on the defamation claim as well, and so could have ducked the
issue.
The entire absence for a long period of time, even for centuries, of a
precedent for an asserted right should have the effect to cause the courts
to proceed with caution before recognizing the right, for fear that they may
thereby invade the province of the lawmaking power; but such absence,
even for all time, is not conclusive of the question as to the existence of
the right. The novelty of the complaint is no objection, when an injury
cognizable by law is shown to have been inflicted on the plaintiff. In such
a case, "although there be no precedent, the common
law will judge
78
according to the law of nature and the public good."
Any exercise of legal authority has the possibility of opening Pandora's
box. This possibility should not stop courts from acting; rather the process
must be trusted to work as well in fashioning a right of privacy as it works in
other contexts:
It may be said that to establish a liberty of privacy would involve in
numerous cases the perplexing question to determine where this liberty
ended, and the rights of others and of the public began. This affords no
reason for not recognizing the liberty of privacy, and giving to the person
aggrieved legal redress against the wrongdoer, in a case where it is clearly
shown that a legal wrong has been done ....

In regard to cases that may

arise under the right of privacy, as in cases that arise under other rights
where the line of demarkation is to be determined, the safeguard of the
individual, on the one hand, and of the public, on the other, is the wisdom
and integrity of the judiciary ....
[There need be no more fear that the
right of privacy will be the occasion of unjustifiable litigation, oppression,
or wrong than that the existence of many other rights in the law would
bring about such results. 79
Unlike the New York majority in Roberson, Justice Cobb sought a
workable way to contain the anti-information aspects of the doctrine as Warren
and Brandeis first formulated it:

77. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 68-69; MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 1.4[B].
78. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 69.
79. Id. at 72.
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The stumbling block which many have encountered in the way of a
recognition of the existence of a right of privacy has been that the
recognition of such a right would inevitably tend to curtail the liberty of
speech and of the press. The right to speak and the right of privacy have
been coexistent. Each is a natural right, each exists, and
each must be
80
recognized and enforced with due respect for the other.
Indeed, in this case, where the use was an advertising one, the court clearly
thought that the constraints being imposed on the "liberty of speech and of the
press" would have little impact on the core informational concerns of society
underlying that liberty.
What we have ruled cannot be in any sense construed as an abridgment
of the liberty of speech and of the press guaranteed in the Constitution ....

[C]ertain it is that one who merely for advertising purposes, and

from mercenary motives, publishes the likeness of another without his
consent, cannot be said, in so doing, to have exercised the right to publish
his sentiments.8 '

F. The Cases Collide With the Constraints of the Paradigm
A very interesting, but at the time unappreciated, transformation in the
right of privacy took place between its exposition by Warren and Brandeis and
its application in Georgia by decision and in New York by statute. The
language of the New York statute and the cases before the Pavesichcourt were
not anti-gossip, anti-intrusion, or anti-press.8 2 The statute punishes an entity
"that uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name,
portrait or picture of any living person."8 3 The Pavesich court concluded:
[The law recognizes, within proper limits, as a legal right, the right of
privacy, and ...

the publication of one's picture without his consent by

another as an advertisement, for the mere purpose of increasing the profits
and gains of the advertiser, is an invasion of this right. . .. '
Rather, both the New York legislature and the Georgia courts acted against the
appropriationof the commercial value of identity for the purposes of trade,
which corresponds with the Restatement's definition of the right of publici-

80. Id. at 73.
81. Id. at 80.
82. See, e.g., David Bedingfield, Privacy or Publicity?The Enduring Confusion Surrounding
the American Tort of Invasion of Privacy, 55 MOD. L. REV. 111, 115 (1992).
83. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1992).
84. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 80-81.
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ty.1 The real focus of these statements is on the nature of the use. Relatively
few of the subsequent privacy cases fit the Warren-Brandeis "yellowjournalism-gone-mad" paradigm. This paucity reflects the clear tensions,
alluded to in Pavesich and discussed more fully later in this article, between
a right to suppress non-defamatory information and the First Amendment
rights of free speech and a free press.86 But whatever the facts, most cases
were still entrapped in the rhetoric of the Warren and Brandeis article and in
its non-commercial, tort-based rationale of personal distress as the articulated
foundation for the claim. The formulation might have been inadequate, but it
was the leading precedent of the time.
One later commentator on the process, arguing in support of a property
approach by asserting that its abandonment was either a mistake or an
exaggeration, has suggested that some of the blame should be laid on plaintiffs
and their counsel, because they continued to frame their complaints in terms
of mental anguish.' But this argument makes a fault of a necessity. All of
the articulated rationales in existing precedent pointed them toward mental
distress. The twisting of an existing doctrine to meet new facts is a familiar
theme in the history of the law. The moment of clairvoyance when the
accumulated irrationalities are recognized and dealt with is the rare exception."3 Even ALI committees do not always rise to the occasion.
One inevitable consequence of the use of the tort paradigm to define
privacy was an accretion of tort-like attributes. These borrowings produced
holdings that seemed at odds both with "natural law" fairness and with the
Lockean principles of an individual's rights in her own person, particularly in
a commercial context. For instance, courts held that public people, who were
accustomed to being in the headlines, could suffer little embarrassment from
the commercial pirating of their name and likeness, and so deserved little, if
89
any, protection either under statute or various common-law formulations.

85. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 46; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 28 § 1.11[C].
86. See Barron, supra note 29, at 880-81; Gordon, supra note 28, at 558; see also infra
section V.A.
87. Gordon, supra note 28, at 554.
88. See generally HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY
HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 29-39 (1883).

89. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941) (finding that the use
of a frequently photographed all-American football player's picture on a calendar did not violate
his right of privacy), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942); Venturi v. Savitt, Inc., 468 A.2d 933,
935 (Conn. 1983) (holding that a golfer did not have an appropriation claim because the
unauthorized use of his picture in an advertisement did not cause him the requisite harm); Pallas
v. Crowley-Milner & Co., 54 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Mich. 1952) (finding that a professional
showgirl "had cast aside the cloak of privacy"); Miller v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 28
N.Y.S.2d 811, 813 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (holding that the use of a photograph of the plaintiffwhich
had been published previously to promote his business did not violate his right of privacy); see
generallyMcCARTHY, supra note 28, §§ 1.6 & 10.7[B]. Interestingly, one of the prime examples
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Another tort-like attribute limited the right of privacy to the period of the
individual's life. If the justification for the right is to prevent embarrassment
and personal distress, then death presumably removes the problem. Similar
considerations have limited the right to sue for defamation under traditional
common-law principles,' but have not limited the duration of the moral
rights of authors in some countries.9 1 Reflecting this principle, the New York
privacy statute restricted protection to "any living person," and the jurisdictions which found privacy in the common law generally followed suit. 2
A third characteristic shared with tort law was the view that the privacy
right was only releasable, and not transferable.93 Since privacy was only a
personal right to be left alone, there was no piece of property to transfer to a
third party-all that could be given was consent as to a particular use. The
right to give other releases remained with the individual, subject only to any
contractually based exclusivity that might have been given in connection with
an earlier release.' And yet some kind of transferability seemed inherent in
a regime aimed at regulating the advertising and icon uses of persona. What
could be done? Judge Frank circumvented this conundrum in Haelan by
invoking, for the first time, a right of publicity.
IV. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND II: PRIVACY BEGETS PUBLICITY

A. Haelan: Publicity Is Born
Haelan Laboratories and Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. were rival manufacturers of chewing gum baseball cards. For some time, young people and a
surprising number of adults have been willing to pay for cards with pictures

cited by Warren and Brandeis was Marion Manola, a noted comic opera star. Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 28, at 195 & n.7; see Dorothy Glancy, Privacy and the Other Miss M, 10
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 401 (1990).
90. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 28, § 560.
91. See generally Stig Str6mholm, XIV INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE
LAw Copyright and IndustrialProperty § 3-181 (J.C.B. Mohr, Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard
Schnicker, eds. 1990).
92. See, e.g., Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Comment, The Descendibilityof the
Right of Publicity:Is There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125, 1127 nn.11-12
(1980) (citing cases which held publicity rights to be uninheritable, analogizing to privacy rights);
Halpern, supra note 28, at 1215.
93. See, e.g., Hendricksonv. CaliforniaNewspapers, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 429,431 (Ct. App.
1975) (finding that the right can not be asserted by anyone other than the person whose privacy
has been invaded), and the cases cited therein. In this it resembles the U.K. "performance right,"
other than that in audio recordings. See Copyright, Designs and Patents, 1988 Act § 192 (Eng.).
94. See, e.g., Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d 763, 766-67 (5th Cir.)
(restricting the subsequent use of baseball players' names on bats where the players had given the
exclusive right to another manufacturer), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935).
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of well-known players on them, together with some statistical information on
the back of the pictures, even when packaged with stale sticks of almost
inedible bubble gum. From one perspective, this is a classic icon use of the
personality of celebrities.95 Haelan attempted to get a lock on this business
by assembling a package of player releases, backed by exclusivity agreements.
The problem for Haelan was how to sue when Topps continued to bring out
its competing cards. In cases where Topps had gone after its own releases,
Haelan could at least make a claim that Topps tortiously induced the players
to breach their exclusivity agreement with Haelan. In cases where Topps
acquired player releases from an independent actor or where Topps simply
used the pictures and names without getting permission, Haelan had no privacy
or interference claim to make. There was no grant of rights to Haelan to sue
on the players' behalf, and even if there were, the public character of a
ballplayer's life might leave a tort-based privacy claim, depending on mental
distress, without recourse.
Judge Frank cut right through the problem. There was no one in court to
whom the mental distress model could apply, and yet there was a thing of
value the rights to which needed to be established. If the mental distress
formulation was too confusing, clearly a new model was necessary.
With regard to such situations, we must consider defendant's
contention that none of plaintiff's contracts created more than a release of
liability, because a man has no legal interest in the publication of his
picture other than his right of privacy, i.e., a personal and non-assignable
right not to have his feelings hurt by such a publication.
A majority of this court rejects this contention. We think that, in
addition to and independent of that right of privacy (which in New York
derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his
photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his
picture, and that such a grant may validly be made "in gross," i.e.,
without an accompanying transfer of a business or of anything else.
Whether it be labelled a "property" right is immaterial; for here, as often
elsewhere, the tag "property" simply symbolizes the fact that courts
enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth.
This right might be called a "right of publicity .
96
We think that New York decisions recognize such a right.

95. For a description of the importance of these cards, see Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736
F.2d 859, 860 (2d Cir. 1984).
96. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps thewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.) (citations
omitted), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
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Judge Frank took into account the market place reality that the use of the
identity of a public figure was something valuable in a world of mass media
and mass marketing:
[l]t is common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors
and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through public
exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer

received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their
countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and

subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them no money unless
it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other
advertiser from using their pictures. 97
Thanks to Judge Frank, both the advertising and icon uses could now be
governed by rules rooted in the market place, rules that might well be better
served, notwithstanding Judge Frank's diffidence, by the linkage to existing
formulations of property law.
B. The Commentators' Battle
The new publicity right gathered some early support. Melville B.
Nimmer, the noted copyright scholar, picked up on the approach right away.
It reflected a previously unaddressed reality and solved a lot of problems that
had been gathering around privacy. In his 1954 article, The Right of
Publicity,98 Nimmer pointed out the limitations of privacy and other possible
theories in protecting what he called "publicity values." He showed how the
publicity right, tied to a property approach, gave a sound theoretical basis to
a market in publicity values that already existed: "The substance of the right
of publicity must be largely determined by two considerations: first, the
economic reality of pecuniary values inherent in publicity and, second, the
inadequacy of traditional legal theories in protecting such publicity values. ",
Judicial and legislative support was slower in coming," ° in part because
of pure confusion at the conflicting labels and rationales which were rapidly
proliferating. Plaintiffs urged a grab-bag of theories on judges seeking to
resolve the ever-broadening questions of who owned what aspect of identity
in relation to the emerging media. It was at this point that one court used the
summary already alluded to:

97. Id. at 868.
98. Ninuner, supra note 28.
99. Id. at 215.
100. MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 1.9.
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The state of the law is still that of a haystack in a hurricane but certain
words and phrases stick out. We read of the right of privacy, of invasion
of property rights, of breach of contract, of equitable servitude, of unfair
competition; and there are even suggestions of unjust enrichment.' 0 '
The march of a property-based right of publicity also slowed when the
right of privacy finally received a systematic and widely respected treatment
from the tort standpoint. William Prosser, the noted scholar and Reporter of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement of Torts), u published an
article entitled Privacy in 1960.13 Prosser was forced to acknowledge that
the right had grown in several different, and not easily reconciled, directions.
He argued, however, that the law of privacy could be most sensibly summarized as a loosely unified, common-law tort with four distinct branches.
What has emerged from the decisions is no simple matter. It is not one
tort, but a complex of four. The law of privacy comprises four distinct
kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied
together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in
common except that each represents an interference with the right of the
plaintiff, in the phrase coined by Judge Cooley, "to be let alone." Without
any attempt to exact definition, these four torts may be described as
follows:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs name
or likeness.
It should be obvious at once that these four types of invasion may be
subject, in some respects at least, to different rules; and that when what is
said as to any one of them is carried over to another, it may not be at all
applicable, and confusion may follow.104
Prosser's approach prevailed, albeit posthumously, in the Restatement of
Torts, at sections 652A-652I, when it appeared in 1977. The successes and
failures of this approach, as clarified in the Restatement of Torts, will be
discussed below. For the purposes of the current historical summary, it is
sufficient at this stage to note some general points about these four categories.

101. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956).
102. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 28.

103. Prosser, supra note 28.
104. Id. at 389 (footnotes omitted).
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The first, physical intrusion into an area of privacy, is more an elaboration of the law of trespass 5 than a restriction on intellectual expression. It
is not so much a right in the persona as in personal space. It concerns us little
if at all in this context, other than as an example of the difficulty the law
experiences in finding clear labels for felt wrongs. The second and third
categories, a right against the public disclosure of private, embarrassing facts
and a right against being shown in a non-defamatory, yet still false, light in a
public context, most closely follow in the original Warren-Brandeis tradition,
constraining information uses. As Prosser himself admits, they are closely
linked to the existing law of defamation.,"i 6 In many ways they are best seen
as modern glosses on this hoary cause of action, and limited ones at that. As
will be argued below, the law has not favored controls over informational
uses, and the second and third categories run directly into the face of the First
Amendment. The kinds of free-speech concerns recognized as early as
Roberson and Pavesich have severely limited their applicability by the
courts. 0 7 There has also been consistent academic criticism over just what
vitality these branches really have in the law, so much so that their demise has
been predicted. 08
It is the fourth right, the "exploitation of attributes of the plaintiff's
identity,"" ° that most overlapped with the publicity concept, and which
regulated activity not largely covered by pre-existing law. Prosser recognized
that this right should be transferable, and referred with approval to the result
in Haelan."° He even surmised that this right was hard to hold in the tort
framework, but dismissed the point: "The interest protected is not so much a
mental as a proprietary one, in the exclusive use of the plaintiff's name and
likeness as an aspect of his identity. It seems quite pointless to dispute over
whether such a right is to be classified as 'property.'""' Perhaps because of

105. Id. at 390.
106. Id. at 390, 398, 400.
107. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Cantrell v. Forest City
Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).

108. See Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 745 (1991);
Susan M. Gilles, All Truths Are Equal, ButAre Some TruthsMore Equal Than Others?, 41 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 725 (1991); J. Clark Kelso, FalseLight Privacy:ARequiem, 32 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 783 (1992); Frederick Schauer, Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 699 (1991); John P. Elwood, Note, Outing, Privacy, and the FirstAmendment, 102 YALE
L.J. 747 (1992); Lorelei Van Wey, Note, PrivateFacts Tort: The EndIs Here, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
299 (1991); see also Bezanson, supra note 28, at 1172-75. See contraRuth Gavison, Too Early
for a Requiem: Warren and Brandeis Were Right on Privacy vs. Free Speech, 43 S.C. L. REV.
437 (1992).
109. Prosser, supra note 28, at 401.
110. Id. at 406-08.
111. Id. at 406.
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of the right,
his tort preoccupation, Prosser still insisted that all four aspects
2
as recognized by American courts, were in the tort mold."
Preserving the tort model, however, kept the legal formulations directed
at mental distress models. Prosser's own continued acceptance of the mental
distress model, particularly in the question of damages for celebrity plaintiffs,
has been pointed out by McCarthy." 3 Those looking at the economic aspect
of a taking of identity, on the other hand, were drawn to the property-publicity
approach. Such a hurt-based split, however, was not really necessary baggage
of a property/tort distinction-each of these regimes can deal both with
economic loss and with the impact of mental distress. The owner of a piece of
real estate (a property concept) can seek redress against another intentionally
coming onto her land equally if the trespass (a tort concept) causes her mental
irritation or economic loss." 4 Likewise, an action for a personal injury (a
tort concept) can provide compensation both for lost wages ' 5 and for pain
and suffering." 6 With uses of the persona, both kinds of harm can exist, and
both kinds of interests, personal and pecuniary, can be damaged. A right that
limits recovery to one or the other invites perjury about motivations that are
inherently internal and subjective.
Notwithstanding its essential artificiality, this split in harms felt by the
plaintiff has remained a durable, if inconsistent, touchstone for the distinction
between privacy and publicity. One scholarly view from the 1960s, for
example, emphasized that:
[n]o man wants to be "used" by another against his will, and it is for
this reason that commercial use of a personal photograph is obnoxious.
Use of a photograph for trade purposes turns a man into a commodity and
makes him serve the economic needs and interest of others. In a community at all sensitive to the commercialization of human values, it is degrading
to thus make a man part of commerce against his will.
Thus, there is really no "right to publicity"; there is only a right,
circumstances, to command a commercial price for abandoning
under some
7
privacy."

A nearly contemporary view took a directly opposite approach:

112. Id. at 408.
113. MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 5.8[A].
114. See 7 STUART M. SPEISER, ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 23:11 (1990); see
generally RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 707.3[2] (1991).
115. See 2 MARILYN MINZER, ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 10.10 (1986).
116. 1 Id. § 4.01.
117. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser,39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 988-89 (1964).
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The rationale for [the appropriation line of cases], although the matter may
be more complex than first appears, is the straight-forward one of
preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will. No social purpose
is served by having the defendant get for free some aspect of the plaintiff
that would have market value and for which he would normally pay. In the
last decade this point has become fully apparent, and we have had to talk
8
of the right to publicity. "
Notwithstanding its limitations, the Prosser article and its tort framework
at least provided a systematic approach where chaos and hurricanes had
previously reigned. It became widely quoted as an authoritative source of law.
Still, it did not fully capture the emerging, if largely inchoate, feelings of
society about how the use of the persona should be allocated and controlled.
Although it sought to encapsulate the field, to provide the moment of
synthesizing clairvoyance, it fell short. For instance, while Prosser's fourth
tort may have allowed for assignability, and so incorporated one result of the
Haelanpublicity-property approach, it was still paradigmatically incompatible
with descendibility of the right and with damages to a celebrity plaintiff, both
of which a property approach could permit without internal contradiction. In
the context of these two issues, the right of publicity continued to be asserted
as an alternative to privacy, and slowly gained acceptance.
C. Zacchini
A major step in this process came in 1977 with the United States Supreme
Court review of the case of Zacchini v. Scripps-HowardBroadcasting Co." 9
Hugo Zacchini was a circus artist whose act involved being shot from a
cannon. A local television news reporter videotaped the entire cannon shot,
which was broadcast on the eleven o'clock news program. Mr. Zacchini sued,
alleging a breach of his common-law right of publicity under Ohio law.
The main focus of the Supreme Court opinion was the applicability of
press freedom concepts: was this an information case or a performance case?
The holding will be discussed more fully below in that context. What is
important at this stage is that the claim was explicitly stated to be in publicity
and not in privacy. The opinion of the Court was written by Justice Byron R.
White. He adopted the emerging orthodoxies about the harm-based differences
between the two rights, although in adherence to the Prosser model he
characterized them both as torts:

118. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966) (footnote omitted).
119. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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The differences between these two torts are important. First, the
State's interests in providing a cause of action in each instance are
different. "The interest protected" in permitting recovery for placing the
plaintiff in a false light "is clearly that of reputation, with the same
overtones of mental distress as in defamation." By contrast, the State's
interest in permitting a "right of publicity" is in protecting the proprietary
interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment.
As we later note, the State's interest is closely analogous to the goals of
patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap the
reward of his endeavors and having little to do with protecting feelings or
120
reputation.
At the level of the Ohio Supreme Court, the assertion of a "publicity"
claim was necessary to clear the hurdles which might still have tripped up a
"privacy" claim brought by a "public" plaintiff. After all, Mr. Zacchini made
his living getting shot from a cannon daily in front of a paying audience. It
was difficult to see how he could have suffered from mental distress over
having his act seen by television viewers, unless the source of that distress was
the loss of potential paying customers. The publicity claim circumvented the
obstacle of mental anguish as articulated in the Warren-Brandeis approach. As
the Ohio court put it:
It seems, of course, somewhat anomalous for the plaintiff, who
regularly performs in public before large crowds, to claim a right of
privacy. The very purpose of a performer is to lure people to come watch
him, and certainly the plaintiff hoped not for privacy, but for a crowd of
thrilled spectators. But there is no real anomaly; the "privacy" which the
performer seeks is personal control over commercial display and exploitation of his personality and the exercise of his talents. In other words,
performers and other public figures wish to keep the benefits of their
performances private, or at least wish to retain control over them, in much
the same way that any individual would wish to keep control over his
name and face. Judge Jerome N. Frank has aptly called this aspect of
privacy "the right of publicity" . . . .121
Although the Court's decision in Zacchin! had no direct effect on the state
law issue of the existence of the right of publicity, it nonetheless gave the right
a national recognition and set in sharper focus the other major debate that
publicity was being invoked to settle: descendibility.

120. Id. at 573 (citations and footnote omitted).
121. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 351 N.E.2d 454,459 (Ohio 1976), rev'd,
433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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For instance, the descendibility issue in the privacy-publicity divide was
squarely faced by a federal district court in Manhattan in 1975. '2 The case
involved Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy, the famous stars of many film
comedies. The control over the post-mortem value of their personas was the
subject of a suit brought by their widows (who were also the sole beneficiaries
of their estates) and the widows' licensee against the Hal Roach Studios,
holder of the copyrights in many of the films, and its licensee.
The court, in deciding for the widows, followed the lead of the Haelan
court, finding that a New York common-law right of publicity existed and
continued as an inheritable item of property after the death of the individual.
In the opinion, Judge Charles E. Stewart, Jr. acknowledged the confusion over
the privacy-publicity split, only to dismiss it as settled:
Many courts have recognized, as a property right, a person's use of his
or her name and likeness. The commercial value of such a right stems
from a person's ability to control its use....
While much confusion is generated by the notion that the right of
publicity emanates from the classic right of privacy, the two rights are
clearly separable. 12
The different characteristics of the two rights were taken as a given and then
used to justify a further difference: descendibility.
In arguing for termination of the right, defendants appear to confuse the
two essentially different concepts, that is, the traditional right of privacy
which clearly terminates upon death of the person asserting such a right
and the right of publicity which we think does not terminate upon death.
Since the theoretical basis for the classic right of privacy, and of the
statutory right in New York, is to prevent injury to feelings, death is a
logical conclusion to any such claim. In addition, based upon the same
theoretical foundation, such a right of privacy is not assignable during life.
When determining the scope of the right of publicity, however, one must
take into account the purely commercial nature of the protected right.
Courts and commentators have done just that in recognizing the right of
publicity as assignable. There appears to be no logical reason to terminate
this right upon death of the person protected. It is for this reason,
presumably, that this publicity right has been deemed a "property right."
If it is not "a matter of dispute that plaintiff has a valuable property
right in his name, photograph and image and that he may sell these

122. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
123. Id. at 843 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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property rights," then what policy should operate to cut off this right at
death?' 24

This is circular reasoning. The assurance with which it was put forward
would be breathtaking, were it not that a system which requires precedent for
innovation is doomed to circularity. Nonetheless, the desired result was
achieved, or was it? The next major challenge to descendibility came in a
California case involving the heirs of Bela Lugosi, but even in New York,
thanks to the complexities of the federal system, the question remained to be
visited again by the authoritative state court system.
D. Lugosi, Valentino, and the CaliforniaStatute
At about the same time as Laurel and Hardy's widows were staking their
claim to inheritable publicity values, the widow and son of Bela Lugosi, the
most famous of the many actors to play Count Dracula on the screen, sued
Universal Pictures in the hope of sharing in some of the image value which
still flowed from that portrayal.'" Universal had begun to license the image
of Lugosi as Dracula for use in merchandising products with little, if any,
relationship to the film itself. These included "plastic toy pencil sharpeners,
soap products, target games, candy dispensers and beverage stirring rods."'6
Although the studio had a contract with Lugosi covering his performance in
the film itself, the heirs argued that the rights transferred did not include the
kind of image licensing, disassociated from the film itself, that was now
occurring. "
Before reaching the contract question, however, it was necessary to decide
whether there was any right under which the heirs could claim in the event
that the contract was defective on the point. The plaintiffs pointed to a
common-law right of publicity, which was creeping into the California legal
world through the federal courts. 2 I But this reliance was at least partially
premature, for the California Supreme Court confirmed on appeal that the
defendants must prevail.
Although California had for some years recognized a common-law right
of privacy, it was cast in the Prosser tort mold, and so terminated at
death.' 29 In an unattributed decision of the California Supreme Court, which

124. Id. at 844 (footnotes and citation omitted).
125. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 427 (Cal. 1979).

126. Id. at 449.
127. Id. at 427.
128. Id. at 429-31; see Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 826
n.15 (9th Cir. 1974).

129. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 428; see also Hendrickson v. California Newspapers, Inc., 121 Cal.
Rptr. 429, 431 (Ct. App. 1975) (holding that the right of privacy was purely personal and died
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simply restated the opinion of the court of appeals and represented a bare four
to three majority, the Lugosi family's claim was denied. The court based its
decision on the necessity of use, a concept borrowed from yet another related
body of law-trademark. The court would not recognize a descendible right
of publicity where Lugosi himself had not exploited his impersonation of
Dracula during his lifetime: "It seems to us rather novel to urge that because
one's immediate ancestor did not exploit the flood of publicity and/or other
evidence of public acceptance he received in his lifetime for commercial
purposes, the opportunity to have done so is property which descends to his
heirs." 3 ' Although other jurisdictions have adopted the lifetime use
requirement,'31 some commentators have criticized it,1 2 and many states
which accept a descendible right of publicity have abandoned it altogether.' 33
The Lugosi court distinguished the right of publicity cases in other
jurisdictions by the fact that lifetime exploitation had occurred. Although the
negative implication remained that a lifetime right was possible, and that once
exploited it might be followed by a post-mortem right, the opinion, in a timehonored pattern, threw the burden of creating a truly general right of publicity
onto the legislature.' 34
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stanley Mosk muddied the waters further
by basing his denial of the Lugosi claims on the fact that Lugosi was an actor
in the Dracula role. Mosk concluded that the icon value now being exploited
derived from the underlying character Dracula, rather than from Lugosi's role
as the performer. The fact that Universal Pictures was licensing the Dracula
bearing Lugosi's distinctive features, instead of a generic one, rather undercut
the argument, although given the public domain status of the underlying
with the individual).
130. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 430.
131. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854, 863-65 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (finding no evidence that Dr. King
commercially exploited his "right to privacy" during his lifetime), rev'd and remanded694 F.2d
674 (11th Cir. 1983); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.Supp. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(holding that author Agatha Christie "exploited" her name during her lifetime); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 22, § 46 cmt. h and reporters' note to cmt. h (stating that several of the jurisdictions
recognizing a right of privacy after death require commercial exploitation prior to death).
132. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 4. 1 [C] (maintaining that the exploitationrequirement erroneously limits the right of publicity to celebrities); Note, An Assessment of the
Commercial ExploitationRequirement as a Limit on the Right of Publicity, 96 HARv. L. REV.
1703 (1983) (arguing that the commercial exploitation requirement is irrational and in conflict
with the public policy of the right of publicity).
133. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc., 296 S.E.2d at 706 (Ga.
1982) (protecting Dr. King's right of privacy after death, even when he did not commercially
exploit it during his lifetime); MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 4.3[C] (discussing cases in which
the court ruled that non-celebrities had a right to control commercial use of their identity,
notwithstanding the fact that it was unexploited).
134. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 431.
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Dracula novel, the Lugosi-featured Dracula was probably all Universal
plausibly had to sell.' 35 Perhaps the correct answer was that rights necessary
to exploit the Lugosi Dracula in fact were divided between Universal and the
Lugosi estate, and only in concert could they market the products in question.
The possibility of such an intermingling-and the essentially factual nature
of the question-was more clearly recognized by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in a 1994 decision, McFarland v. Miller.'36 Be that as it may,
Justice Mosk asserted that Lugosi had no rights in himself as the13 7Dracula
character, whatever his rights to his own persona might have been.
Lugosi also contained an eloquent dissent by Chief Justice Rose E. Bird.
Following the accepted wisdom of the time, she argued that Lugosi was not a
classic privacy case, but something different:
The appropriation of an individual's likeness for another's commercial
advantage often intrudes on interests distinctly different than those
protected by the right of privacy. Plaintiffs in this case have not objected
to the manner in which Universal used Lugosi's likeness nor claimed any
mental distress from such use. Rather, plaintiffs have asserted that
Universal reaped an economic
windfall from Lugosi's enterprise to which
38
they are rightfully entitled.
What justified the new and different claim was the emergence of the business
of merchandising, which she recognized as involving both advertising and icon
uses: "Today, it is commonplace for individuals to promote or advertise
commercial services and products or, as in the present case, even have their
identities infused in the products. ""' The value of this new kind of
economic activity should belong to the individual, as the prime investor in his
or her own image. As Chief Justice Bird stated: "An unauthorized commercial
appropriation of one's identity converts the potential economic value in that
identity to another's advantage. The user is enriched, reaping one of the
benefits of the celebrity's investment in himself." 40
The dissent went on to examine the parameters of the right, and
concluded that it is indeed descendible. Chief Justice Bird even set a time
period for its duration after death. In the absence of legislation, she analogized

135. Id. at 431-34 (Mosk, J., concurring).
136. 14 F.3d 912, 920-21 (3rd Cir. 1994) (commenting on Justice Mosk's concurrence and
holding that a material issue of fact existed regarding whether the actor's identity was
"inextricably identified" with the character).
137. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 432 (Mosk, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 437 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
139. Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 438 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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to the Copyright Act of 1976, 11 and opined that the term should be life plus
fifty years.' 42
In Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions,43 a decision handed
down only two days after Lugosi, Chief Justice Bird wrote a concurring
opinion that articulated further the parameters of the right of publicity, this
time treating a fictionalized creative use with far greater tolerance than she
showed to the icon uses in Lugosi. This case involved a television film made
about the life of Rudolf Valentino. His purported nephew brought suit for a
violation of the common-law right of publicity. The Guglielmi court simply
cited Lugosi for the proposition that the right of publicity was not descendible.' 44 Justice Bird concurred in the result, agreeing that there was no
violation of the plaintiff s rights, but not because of the decendibility question.
Instead, she focused on the value of the creative use to society and on the
leeway appropriately granted for such a use.
Film is a "significant medium for the communication of ideas."
Whether exhibited in theaters or on television, a film is a medium which
is protected by the constitutional guarantees of free expression. A film is
protection only if it falls
presumptively protected and will forfeit that
145
within "narrowly limited classes" of cases.
It seems reasonable to conjecture that she hoped to combine this concurrence
with her dissent in Lugosi in order to establish what she perceived to be the
proper basis of the California right of publicity. When the California
legislature acted a few years later, she pretty well got her wish.
In 1985, as part of a general overhaul of its right-of-privacy legislation,
California enacted a statutory post-mortem right of publicity. 46 It adopted
the life-plus-50 approach, and made it clear that the right was available
"whether or not during the lifetime of that natural person the person used his
or her name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness on or in products,
merchandise or goods, or for the purposes of advertising or selling, or
solicitation of purchase of, products, merchandise, goods or service."147 The
inclusion of the lifetime right of publicity was made clear in changes to the
lifetime right of privacy statute.' 4 8 It is worth noting the broad freedom

141. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1994).
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 446 (Bird, C.J., dissenting); see 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994).
603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979) (en banc) (per curiam).
Id. at 455.
Id. at 457 (Bird, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1996).
Id. § 990(h).
Id. § 3344 (West Supp. 1996).
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which both of these statutes granted to informational uses, 149 and the
somewhat more narrow freedom granted to creative uses of a deceased
person's identity.15 The shift away from use of the term "commercial," or
some similar word, as a catch-all summary and toward recognizing somewhat
different treatments among the different uses provided a refreshing change.
The failure to give an open ended definition to identity,' 5 ' however, coupled
with the preservation of the common-law causes of action for living people, 5 2 put the subsequent focus of creative judges back on the common-law
rights. 1

E. Stephano: The New York State Courts Answer Haelan
The next step in this survey of the development of the law of privacy and
publicity leads us back to New York State. The common-law right of publicity
was invented in Haelan by a federal court trying to predict what a New York
court would decide on the issue. But publicity got a mixed reception in the
lower state courts in New York, 54 and doubts grew about the validity of the
Haelan holding. Finally, in 1984 the Court of Appeals, New York's highest
tribunal, rejected the notion that a separate right of publicity was a part of the
New York common law in Stephano v. News Group Publication, Inc.'5
In Stephano, a model brought suit against a magazine for publishing a
picture of him when he had not signed a release. The statute required a written
consent for a waiver. Although the decision turned on the newsworthiness of
the use, rather than on the nature of the claim, the New York Court of
Appeals at least partially clarified the question of a New York right of
publicity. It reconfirmed that the sole source of law in this area was the New
York privacy statute-sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights
Law. 6 The court went on, however, to deal in the "privacy" context with
at least some of the limits which had led to the invention of the right of
publicity. It pointed out that the statute was not designed just "to protect the

149. Id. §§ 990(j), 3344(d).
150. Id. § 990(n).
151. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 990(a), 3344(a) (West Supp. 1996).
152. Id. § 3344(g).
153. See infra part III.C.
154. Compare Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct.
1968) (holding that an action for the right to publicity lies only when one party commercially
exploits another's right), aff'd, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1969) with Paulsen v. Personality
Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (holding that a public figure is not entitled to
benefit from every commercial use of his name).
155. 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984).
156. Id. at 583-84.
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sentiments, thoughts and feelings of an individual."57 "Commercial"
interests were also protectable, and for this aspect of the statutory right the
label of "publicity" was appropriate:
The statute ... is not limited to situations where the defendant's conduct
has caused distress to a person who wishes to lead a private life free of all
commercial publicity.
By its terms the statute applies to any use of a person's picture or
portrait for advertising or trade purposes whenever the defendant has not
obtained the person's written consent to do so. It would therefore apply,
and recently has been held to apply, in cases where the plaintiff generally
seeks publicity, or uses his name, portrait, or picture, for commercial
purposes but has not given written consent for a particular use .... In this
respect the statute parallels the common-law right of privacy which
generally provides remedies for any commercialization of the individual's
personality without his consent. Since the "right of publicity" is encompassed under the Civil Rights Law as an aspect of the right of privacy,
which, as noted, is exclusively statutory in this State, the plaintiff cannot
claim an independent common-law right of publicity. 158
This approach solved one of the privacy problems, the rights of
celebrities. The decision left the two other main questions-transferability and
descendibility-expressly open: "In view of the fact that the plaintiff is
asserting his own right of publicity we need not consider whether the statute
would also control assignment, transfer or descent of publicity rights. "'9
The transfer issue is not clearly dealt with in the statute, and has not been
treated authoritatively since Stephano.'" If the commercial realities are given
due weight in any subsequent review of the issue, the Haelan approach-if not
its rationale-may still be good law. Descendibility, however, is another
matter. Section 50 expressly mentions "the name, portrait or picture of any
living person" and section 51 gives a civil cause of action for violations of
section 50.16 There seems little reason to think that a post-mortem right
could exist within these bounds. In a decision handed down less than a year
after the Stephano opinion, the court confusingly reserved the issue of
"whether a common-law descendible right of publicity exists in this
State." 6 2 The federal courts, where the issue of publicity initially arose,

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 584 (quoting Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 164 N.E.2d 853, 855 (N.Y. 1959)).
Id. at 584 (citations omitted).
Id. at 584 n.2.
MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 6.9[F][4].
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996).
Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 489 N.E.2d 744, 745 (N.Y. 1985).
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have since concluded that there is no post-mortem right in New York. 63 The
door was more firmly closed by the New York Court of Appeals in the 1993
case Howell v. New York Post Co.: 6 "While the courts of other jurisdictions have adopted some or all of these [other Prosser] torts, in this state the
right to privacy is governed exclusively by sections 50 and 51 of the Civil
Rights Law; we have no common law of privacy."" 6 Bills to amend or
in
supplement the privacy statute to clarify these issues have been introduced
66
the New York legislature, but so far have not been acted upon.
By the early 1990s, on the verge of its inclusion in the Restatement, the
trend of the law towards recognizing the publicity right was well advanced.
Nonetheless, in some states publicity was not yet a fully settled issue.
McCarthy, in the June 1995 revision of his treatise, listed twenty-five of the
fifty states as having recognized the right at common law, having enacted a
statute that covers it, or both. 67 But in places like New York where the twig
was bent early into a tort-like shape, and particularly where the approach was
made statutory, the old articulations of privacy were still hard to break.
McCarthy's conclusion, with the benefit of hindsight, was that the distinction
between privacy and publicity, at least in the appropriation area, was artificial
and a source of unnecessary confusion. 6
V. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND III: AREAS OF AGREEMENT

Whatever the theoretical distinctions between privacy and publicity, in
practice they have proved indistinguishable in many of their attributes. On
these common issues the statutes can read identically, and the courts swap
precedents freely. Two illustrative aspects are discussed in this section: free
speech and the indicia of identity.
A. Free Speech vs. Privacy and Publicity
As far back as the Pavesichcase, courts and legislatures have recognized
that free speech concerns must be balanced against individual rights in
regulating uses of the persona. "The stumbling block which many have
encountered in the way of a recognition of the existence of a right of privacy

163. Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 586 (2d Cir. 1990).
164. 612 N.E.2d 699 (N.Y. 1993).
165. Id. at 703.
166. See McCARTHY, supra note 28, § 6.9[D]; Alison Sachs, It's Up to You, New York-It's
Time for a Statutory Right of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 59 (1995).
167. MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 6.1[B] (counting New York as one of the statutory
jurisdictions).
168. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
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has been that the recognition of such a right would inevitably tend to curtail
the liberty of speech and of the press. "169
Our society has generally chosen to make the information and creative
values of a person's identity a common good, relatively free for all to use.
This commonality, and the free exchange of information which it permits,
have deep roots in a liberal democracy and are broadly reflected in our
law. 7 ' Such an approach underlies the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution, and has been upheld by American judges of all political
stripes.171 In a passage in which the irony is palpable when compared to his
prose in Privacy, Justice Louis Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court
wrote:
The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions-knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-become, after voluntary
communication to others, free as the air to common use. Upon these
incorporeal productions the attribute of property is continued after such
communication only in certain classes of cases where public policy has
seemed to demand it.' 72
Creative uses have also been given considerable license, as Justice Bird's
attitudes in Guglielmi exemplify.' 73
Far less protected have been advertising, icon and performance uses.
Reflecting a deeply felt distinction, advertising has always been the poor
stepchild of the law of freedom of the press, and the first amendment
protection of "commercial speech" has sometimes been awarded grudgingly
or in a somewhat diluted form. 1 Courts have also made some distinction

169. Pavesich, 50 S.E. 68, 73 (Ga. 1905).
170. See, e.g., the Court's discussion of free speech in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (maintaining that the opportunity for free speech is a fundamental principle
to be considered "against the background of a profound national commitment").
171. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105 (1991) (finding that New York's Son of Son Law was an obvious content-based
infringement on First Amendment rights); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)
(finding that absent actual malice, ad parody is protected as a free flow of ideas and opinions).
172. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
173. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., _ U.S. _, 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995) (finding
that the Federal Administration Act provision prohibiting beer labels from displaying alcohol
content did not advance the government's interest sufficiently to justify the commercial speech
restriction); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)
(holding that the commission's restriction of commercial speech was greater than necessary to
meet the government's interest); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (recognizing that commercial speech is unprotected by the
First Amendment where its restriction is in furtherance of a substantial governmental interest);

Published by Scholar Commons, 1996

39

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:709

between the informational aspect of advertising and its rather more purely
manipulative trappings of image and puffery. 75 Thus, the threshold question
for a free speech challenge is what kind of use is being challenged? If it is an
informational or creative use, the free speech argument will weigh much more
heavily; if it is an advertising, icon or performance use, far less so.
Even with a purported informational use, however, the free speech
interest is not absolute. Little positive societal value, and often even considerable negative harm, exists in the dissemination of false information. The
traditional law of defamation recognized this by immunizing truth but
punishing falsehood. 7 6 However, by 1964 this pure truth standard was
recognized to be too rigorous. Its application would inhibit society from
enjoying all of the benefits available from a stream of information. After all,
as James Madison observed: "Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the
proper use of everything; and in no instance is this more true than in that of
77
the press. "1
Therefore, in the classic case of New York Times v. Sullivan, the United
States Supreme Court gave license to the disseminator of information to be
wrong, at least about public figures, provided the disseminators did not act
with "actual malice," defined for this purpose as knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for truthfulness.17 1 With respect to private figures, not
acting in a sphere that makes them at least temporarily public, a somewhat
can be applied to defamation
more rigorous standard, akin to negligence,
79
claims for false informational uses. 1
These concerns about the kinds of use and about the truthfulness of the
use have informed the law of privacy and publicity at both the state and
federal levels. When the states have looked at the truthfulness issue, however,
they have often confusingly proposed a test that uses a vocabulary of
"commerciality." Commerciality is not normally synonymous with "falsehood." Furthermore, as previously noted, most media ventures in the United
States involve the desire to make money, and can therefore be characterized

Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384-87 (1973)
(holding job advertisements in a newspaper "to be purely commercial advertising and unprotected"); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (holding municipal ordinance forbidding
distribution in the streets of printed handbills of commercial advertising matter constitutional).
See generally P. Cameron DeVore & Robert D. Sack, Advertising and Commercial Speech in
COMMUNICATIONS LAv 1995, at 51 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop.
Course Handbook Series No. 422, 1995); MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 8.3.
175. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12 (1979) (finding that a trade name was "a
form of commercial speech [with] no intrinsic meaning").
176. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 28, § 581A.
177. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (quoting 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 571 (1876)).
178. Id. at 280.
179. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974).
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for the distinction to which they were being linked, but such terms were also
being used elsewhere in free speech debates to distinguish informational and
creative uses from advertising, icon and performance uses. The commercial
terminology was not particularly helpful in making either set of distinctions,
and its use in both more than doubled the confusion. Rather, "commercial"
has served as a label, attached after the fact, for uses that do not fall within
that sphere of responsible journalistic or artistic practice that are protected by
a particular court's largely unarticulated vision of free speech.
In New York, for instance, advertising uses and informational uses have
become associated, respectively, with the phrases "for advertising purposes"
and "for the purposes of trade," both of which are controlled under sections
50 and 51.180 As the trial judge described these terms in Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc.: 8'
Where the unauthorized use of name or picture has been purely for
"advertising purposes," in the sense of promoting the sale of a collateral
product, stringent enforcement of the statutory prohibition has presented
comparatively little difficulty and relief from such "commercial exploitation" has been liberally granted even to those who might be characterized
"public figures." A far more restrictive treatment, however, has been
accorded the proscription against use "for the purposes of trade,"
particularly where the use has been in furtherance of the business of a
communications medium. Consonant with constitutional considerations, it
has consistently been emphasized that the statute was not intended to limit
activities involving the dissemination of news or information concerning
matters of public interest and that such activities are privileged and do not
fall within "the purposes of trade" contemplated by Section 51, notwithstanding that they are also carried on for-a profit.182
Nor do such definitional settings provide clear guidance for establishing
the boundary between advertising and informational uses. The placement of
this boundary arose in Stephano, which involved the use of photos in a
magazine article concerning where to shop.' The court stated: "The only
question then is whether the defendant used the plaintiff's picture for trade or
advertising purposes within the meaning of the statute when it published his
picture in the 'Best Bets' column without his consent. " " The Stephano
court held that the information content predominated:

180. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (MeKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996).

181. 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
182. Id. at 505-06 (citations omitted).
183. Stephano, 474 N.E.2d 580, 584-86.
184. Id. at 584.
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The plaintiff does not dispute the fact that the information provided in
the article is of legitimate reader interest. Indeed, similar information is
frequently provided in reviews or news announcements of books, movies,
shows or other new products including fashions. Nor does the plaintiff
contend that it is uncommon for commercial publishers to print legitimate
news items or reviews concerning products by persons or firms who have
previously advertised in the publisher's newspaper or magazine. In short,
the plaintiff has not presented any facts which would set this particular
article apart from the numerous other legitimate news items concerning
new products. He offers only his speculative belief that in this case the
information on the jacket was included in the defendant's column for
advertising purposes or perhaps, more vaguely, to promote additional
advertising. That, in our view, is insufficient to defeat the defendant's
motion for summary judgment. The rule exempting articles of public
interest from the operation of the Civil Rights Law would, as a practical
matter, lose much of its force if publishers of articles which are at least
prima facie newsworthy were required to incur the expense of a trial to
meet such general and insubstantial accusations of disguised advertising. 15
This resolved the particular case, but little general guidance was given on
drawing the line in future cases.
"Commerciality" versus "newsworthiness" has sometimes turned on the
freshness of the items reported. The early cases, perhaps sharing some of the
Warren-Brandeis vision of the news media run mad, were sympathetic to
reformed felons whose sordid pasts were truthfully dredged up some years
later with terrible results to their attempts to lead new and respectable lives.
For instance, in the 1931 case Melvin v. Reid,"8 6 the plaintiff was a former
prostitute who had been tried for murder and acquitted. After she had forsaken
her wicked ways and married happily, a movie entitled "The Red Kimono"
was produced based on her story, revealing her shocking past and using her
real name. This disclosure of admittedly true information was too much, felt
the court, for "[e]ven the thief on the cross was permitted to repent during the
hours of his final agony."" s Over time, however, courts have generally
become less sympathetic to the reformed criminal alleging stale news and more
and more protective of the disclosure of true, if embarrassing, informa88
tion. 1

185. Id. at 586 (citation omitted).
186. 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
187. Id.at 93.
188. See, e.g., Bernstein v.National Broadcasting Co., 129 F.Supp. 817 (D.D.C.1955)
(holding that a television program based on the plaintiff's past criminal activity, but not using his
name, did not violate his right of privacy); Leopold v. Levin, 259 N.E.2d 250 (I1l. 1970)
(holding that a fictionalized version of the plaintiff's prior criminal activity did not violate his
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Rather than worrying about time factors, the analysis has come to turn on
the level of public interest and the truthfulness of the report. Although
truthfulness is a prime factor in the constitutional analysis, it also enters at the
state level in the "commerciality" analysis. For instance, the ever-reclusive
Howard Hughes tried to use New York's privacy statute to suppress the
publication of a book about him by exclusively selling his rights of privacy
and publicity to a friendly corporation. This company then sued the publisher
of the unauthorized biography. Although the court also relied on constitutional
free speech grounds, it held:
The allegation that the book was published for "purposes of trade" and
profit does not as plaintiff seeks to imply, alter its protected status. The
publication of a newspaper, magazine, or book which imparts truthful
news or other factual information to the public does not fall within "the
purposes of trade" contemplated by the New York statute, even though
such publication is sold for a profit.
The remaining ground on which plaintiff seeks to justify this suit is the
assignment to it of Hughes' "right of publicity".... The publication of
a biography is clearly outside the ambit of the "commercial use" contemplated by the "right of publicity" and such right can have no application
to the publication of factual material which is constitutionally protected. 189
This brings us to the impact of the First Amendment on the law of privacy and
publicity.
B. The FirstAmendment Standard
The First Amendment standard restricting the right of privacy was
established in 1967 by the Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill.'9 The case
involved a family which had been held hostage in their home by a criminal.
The incident had been widely reported, and formed the basis of a novel and
play, both called The Desperate Hours. The production of the play was
publicized through an article in Life magazine, which took actors from the play
to the actual house where the Hill family had been held, and then staged

right of privacy); see also Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.) (finding that New
Yorker article did not violate past child prodigy's right to privacy), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711
(1940). But see Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971) (finding that the
publication of plaintiff's name is connection with criminal activity eleven years after plaintiff's
involvement created a cause of action). See generally Gordon, supra note 28, at 590; Prosser,
supra note 28, at 396.
189. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 128-29 (Sup. Ct.
1968) (citations omitted).
190. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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fictionalized incidents from the play in the house, with the false implication
that they reenacted the Hills' actual experience.' 91 Richard Nixon, during his
time in private practice in New York City and ever in conflict with the press,
argued the case for the Hills.
The courts in New York state had followed the mixed fiction versus fact
and advertising and trade versus newsworthiness approach:
Although the play was fictionalized, Life's article portrayed it as a
reenactment of the Hill's experience. It is an inescapable conclusion that
this was done to advertise and attract further attention to the play, and to
increase present and future magazine circulation as well. It is evident that
the article cannot be characterized as a mere dissemination of news, nor
even an effort to supply legitimate newsworthy information in which the
public had, or might have a proper interest.' 92

In a case involving similar issues that had been winding its way through the
New York courts at the same time, the New York Court of Appeals made it
clear that truthful reporting was privileged while fictionalized reporting was
not. 193

The United States Supreme Court held, however, that the standard of
fictionalization versus truthfulness was too exacting for the First Amendment
right of free speech. Rather, in his majority opinion Justice William J.
Brennan borrowed the "malice" standard from the Court's analysis in
defamation cases, and most notably from New York Times v. Sullivan. 9 '
Statements about public figures, even though false and harmful, were
privileged unless they were made with "malice," defined again as actual
knowledge of falsity or a reckless disregard for the truth. This standard is best
explained in reverse: a news organization or other media entity will not be
held liable if it has acted at all responsibly in its fact-gathering about a public
figure, even if in the end it is wrong about what it publishes to the world. The
Supreme Court in Time v. Hill applied this approach to privacy claims, and
remanded the case for further proceedings at the state level to evaluate the
behavior of Life's reporters. 95
191. Id. at 378-79.
192. Hill v. Hayes, 240 N.Y.S.2d 286, 290 (App. Div. 1963).
193. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 221 N.E.2d 543 (N.Y. 1966) (involving a "biography"
of a well-known sports figure where the author simply made up much of the book).

194. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
195. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 391-97. The later case of Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975) upheld the media's constitutional right to publish the name of a deceased rape
victim in the face of a state "privacy" statute aimed at keeping such victims anonymous,
confirming the constitutional privilege for truthful reporting. See also Jon E. Grant, Note,
"Outing" and Freedom of the Press: Sexual Orientation'sChallenge to the Supreme Court's
CategoricalJurisprudence,77 CORNELL L. R-V. 103, 117-18 (1991).
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Although the Time v. Hill holding applied to a claim that had been
characterized as belonging to the "false light" branch of the right of privacy,
most courts presumed that it also provided the answer for appropriation
privacy and right of publicity cases: a true, informational use in the media
would be immunized. But the 1977 decision of the Supreme Court in Zacchini
made it clear that the constitutional rules on appropriation privacy and
publicity have some wrinkles of their own.96
The basic facts of the Zacchini case have been outlined above. The key
to the constitutional discussion at the state level was that there was no
falsehood in the news report of a matter of legitimate public interest: the
television station showed all of Mr. Zacchini's act exactly as it occurred. The
Ohio Supreme Court, applying the Time v. Hill approach, thought that this was
the end of the matter: an informational use, no falsehood, therefore immunity.'97 But a one-vote majority of the Supreme Court viewed the case
differently. Justice White's opinion analogized the property aspects of the right
of publicity to copyright law, and made the distinction between reporting the
facts of the performance and broadcasting the performance itself.
Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn between media
reports that are protected and those that are not, we are quite sure that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they
broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent. The Constitution no
more prevents a State from requiring respondent to compensate petitioner
for broadcasting his act on television than it would privilege respondent to
film and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the
copyright owner ....

"'

Thus, in Justice White's view, a performance use had predominated,
overcoming any informational aspect and bringing a totally different calculus
to bear.
Four justices dissented. Justice Louis F. Powell, Jr., in an opinion joined
by two others, focused on the television station's actions: the broadcast was
a "regular news program," not "a subterfuge or cover for private or
commercial exploitation."' 99 Notwithstanding the different results, the
analytic approaches of Justices Powell and White are in fact quite similar. For
both, the goal was to allow informational use while preventing someone from
inappropriately getting something for nothing in the business of performance.

196. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569-79 (1977).
197. Id. at 565.
198. Id. at 574-75 (citations omitted).
199. Id. at 581 (Powell, J., dissenting). Of course this very distinction, although common,
disregards the private and commercial nature of regular news programs.
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They simply disagreed over the nature of the use of Mr. Zacchini's act in the
local newscast: did its performance or informational attributes predominate?
Lower courts continue to give relief to personalities suffering from image
rip-off in a purported informational context, notwithstanding the First
Amendment, and they continue to describe both the falsehood and the nature
of use questions under labels of "commerciality." For instance, in a 1983
California decision, the California Court of Appeals reviewed a claim that the
National Enquirer, a notoriously sensational weekly tabloid newspaper, had
wrongly appropriated Clint Eastwood's celebrity appeal when it ran a story
headlined "Clint Eastwood in Love Triangle with Tanya Tucker." 2 °°
Eastwood argued that the story was a complete fabrication and, therefore, a
violation of his rights of privacy and publicity. The NationalEnquirersought
dismissal of the case, largely on constitutional grounds. Overturning the lower
court, the court of appeals allowed the case to go forward, pointing out that
if the article were a fabrication, it would not be privileged under Time v. Hill.
Tying the two constitutional strands back together, the court stated:
Finally, Enquirer contends that falsity is the predicate, not for
commercial appropriation, but for false light claims. We disagree.
As noted earlier, all fiction is literally false, but enjoys constitutional
protection. However, the deliberate fictionalization of Eastwood's
personality constitutes commercial exploitation, and becomes actionable
2°0
when it is presented to the reader as if true with the requisite scienter.
Free speech and publicity had another balancing session in a recent case
involving Vanna White, the widely recognized performer on the game show
Wheel of Fortune.2' Ms. White has achieved a high level of celebrity in her
role as a generally silent letter-turner, and the name "Vanna" standing by itself
is widely recognized as referring to her. Samsung, a manufacturer and
distributor of electronic goods, prepared a series of advertisements that showed
the fate of celebrities and other popular culture symbols in the twenty-first
century, comparing their longevity to that of Samsung products. One ad
showed a picture of a robot, with hair and dress very much like that of Ms.
White, standing in a familiar Vanna pose in front of a Wheel of Fortune style
game board. The caption read "Longest running game show. 2012 A.D."
While Samsung and its advertising agency had gotten the permission of the
celebrities actually depicted in other ads in the series, they had not gotten the

200. Eastwood v. Superior Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 345 (Ct. App. 1983).
201. Id. at 352.
202. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied,
989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
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permission of Ms. White. She sued." 3 Here, the free speech issue was
whether the creative use of parody predominated over the advertising context.
Although such parody aspects can prevail in a classic First Amendment
free speech analysis under copyright law,2' 4 they failed here in light of what
was seen by the majority as a cold-blooded taking of identity for use in an
advertisement under a thin veil of humor.20" The majority felt that the use
was not at its heart a creative one, but rather advertising. The dissent argued
against the extension of the common-law right to a case where the actual
person is patently not being used. 2"
The passions ignited by this case were not limited to the actual litigants.
The judiciary of the Ninth Circuit became sufficiently interested that a vote
was requested by an active judge on the question of a rehearing en bane. The
rehearing was denied by a majority of the judges voting, and Ms. White's
victory, at least in surviving summary judgement, was confirmed.7 One of
the minority, Judge Kozinski, was moved to write a long dissent. White was
a creative use case, he argued, and the majority's extension of the right of
publicity seriously tipped the societal balance between intellectual property
rights and free expression.
Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it.
Creativity is impossible without a rich public domain. Nothing today,
likely nothing since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science
and technology, grows by accretion, each new creator building on the
works of those who came before. Overprotection stifles the very creative
forces it's supposed to nurture. 08
Parody, Judge Kozinski argued, has long been recognized as a defense against
copyright infringement-why should it not apply here to the commercial with
the blonde robot?0 9 The White case has engendered much commentary, and
some scholars suggest that the case goes too far.210

203. Id. at 1396-97.
204. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994)
(holding that the commercial nature of a rap group's parody of a copyrighted song did not prevent
a claim of "fair use").
205. White, 971 F.2d at 1401.
206. Id. at 1402-08 (Alarcon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
207. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2443 (1993).
208. Id. at 1513.
209. Id. at 1517-21; see also Gretchen A. Pemberton, The Parodist's Claim to Fame: A
ParodyException to the Right of Publicity, 27 U.C. DAviS L. REv. 97 (1993).
210. See Michael E. Hartmann & Daniel R. Kelly, Parody (of Celebrities, in Advertising),
Parity (Betveen Advertising and Other Types of Commercial Speech), and (the Property Right
of) Publicity, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 633, 647-54 (1995); Pemberton, supra note 209,
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C. Indicia of Identity
The question of just what aspects of a person's identity are protected has
been the point of contention in many of the reported cases, and is a point of
great similarity between privacy and publicity.2 ' In most of these cases,
there is no dispute over the nature of the use-they are clear examples of
advertising. Rather, the question is to whom does the use refer, and in what
manner is it made? By and large, courts and juries have been able to look
beyond the limits of prior formulations to keep pace with the imagination of
would be users.
In Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc."' the New York State Court of
Appeals faced the complaint of an irate woman who claimed that a picture of
her and her daughter had been used to market a cosmetic product without her
consent. What was unusual about the case was that the photo in question did
not show the face of the two individuals, but instead a rear view, nude. They
had been bathing naked in a secluded spot when a photographer had intruded
with his prying lens. The husband (and father) had chased the intruder away,
but not before the offending photograph had been taken. The case demonstrates how images of quite anonymous people can bring value to an unrelated
product if they and the setting provide attractive images.
New York cases had previously established that a section 51 claim
requires the use of an identifiable likeness. Truly generic images, even if
inspired by a real person, are unrecoverable. The defendants in Cohen argued
that the posterior view used here was not identifiable. The husband argued
otherwise. He, at least, recognized his wife from the photo, and not just
because he was present when the photo was taken.2" 3 Cases like this one,
involving nudity and sex, often arouse judicial sympathy. Here, the court
accepted the husband's assertion at face value and awarded damages to the
plaintiff.

at 98-100; John F. Hyland & Ted C. Lindquist, III, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics
America, Inc.: The Wheels of JusticeTake an Unfortunate Turn, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
299 (1993).
211. See generally Seth E. Bloom, Preventing the Misappropriationof Identity: Beyond the
"Right of Publicity," 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 489 (1991) (discussing the scope of
publicity); Steven T. Margolin, Comment, FrontImitationto Litigation:Expanded Protectionfor
Commercial PropertyRights in Identity, 96 DICK. L. REV. 491,498-502,504-508 (1992) (stating
that the cases show a trend towards protecting a person's style and characteristics); Leonard A.
Wohl, Note, The Right of Publicity and Vocal Larceny: Sounding Off on Sound-Alikes, 57
FORDHAM L. REV. 445 (1988) (discussing the adoption of Prosser's privacy doctrine as a source
for publicity law and the expansion of publicity rights).
212. 472 N.E.2d 307 (N.Y. 1984).
213. Id. at 309-10.
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The plaintiff in Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.214 faced
a different problem in proving a taking of his identity. Lothar Motschenbacher
was a famous race car driver who drove a car with distinctive markings.
Reynolds manufactures the Winston brand of cigarettes. Reynolds based an
advertisement for Winstons on a photo of Motschenbacher's car, pictured in
the foreground with several others in the middle of a race. The driver's
features, however, were indistinguishable. A "balloon" appeared from the car
which declared, "Did you know that Winston tastes good, like a cigarette
should?" The picture had been doctored to cloud identification. All of the
numbers on the cars had been changed, and a spoiler had been added to the
rear of Mr. Motschenbacher's car. Nonetheless, distinctive colors, pinstriping
and an unusual oval shape encircling the car's number remained. The federal
court, applying its view of California common law and Prosser's appropriation
tort in its economic incarnation, held that these factors were sufficient to
warrant relief. "We need not decide whether [the California courts] would do
'
so under the rubric of 'privacy,' 'property,' or 'publicity.'" 215
Notwithstanding the alterations made by Reynolds, knowledgeable people would
recognize the car and its driver and presume the rest.
A different wrinkle came up in Onassis v. ChristianDior-New York,
Inc.21 6 Christian Dior had created as part of its advertising a fictional trio
known as "the Diors"-one female, two males, the whole menage a little
ambiguous. In the campaign, the Diors turn up in a variety of chic spots,
including the wedding of two of the three. In the picture of the wedding, the
guests include a number of real-life minor celebrities and one fake-a woman
who bears a striking resemblance to Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis. The
resemblance was heightened by the dress and make up which the fake, a
secretary named Barbara Reynolds, had put on for the occasion. 21 7 Ms.
Onassis sued in New York under section 51 of the Civil Rights Law. The
defendants argued that her claim must fail. Quite literally, they had not used
Ms. Onassis' picture or portrait, they had used the picture of someone
else.218 The court was not persuaded: it held that a real face can be used to
create a portrait of someone else altogether, as was exactly the intent in the
219
advertisement.

214. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
215. Id. at 825-26 (notes omitted).
216. 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1984), aff'd, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (App. Div. 1985).
217. Ms. Reynolds carried on a regular sideline in this impersonation, handled by Ron Smith
Celebrity Look-Alikes, a company which has figured in more than its share of privacy and
publicity litigation. Id. at 257.
218. Id. at 258.
219. Id. at 263.
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A further extension of the idea of identity took place in Carson v. Here's
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 22 in which the court ruled on the use of the
name "Here's Johnny" to identify a portable toilet service. John W. Carson,
better known by the nickname "Johnny," objected to the double pun behind
the choice of this name. The manager of the portable toilet company admitted
that the use of "Here's Johnny" in the name of his firm was inspired by its
connection with the entertainer and his distinctive "Here's Johnny" introduction on The Tonight Show. In case anyone missed the point, the firm's slogan
was "The World's Foremost Commodian." 22 1 The question was whether
such a connection could prevent the use of the phrase "Here's Johnny."
Carson had been active in promoting products associated with his name, but
he had never been active in the portable toilet line, so there was little
likelihood of confusion. Therefore, a trade name or unfair competition claim
could not stand.2" The privacy and publicity issue, however, remained.
The federal appeals panel divided on the issue two to one. The majority
applied Michigan common law rights of privacy and publicity, presuming that
Michigan would recognize the publicity right,' and citing Prosser's
Handbook of the Law of Torts in support of publicity's general acceptance.22
The court held for Mr. Carson, stating: "The right of publicity, as we have
stated, is that a celebrity has a protected pecuniary interest in the commercial
exploitation of his identity. If the celebrity's identity is commercially
exploited, there has been an invasion of his right whether or not his 'name or
likeness' is used."' In so holding, the court made reference to the identification of Mr. Motschenbacher through his car and also cited a case involving
Muhammad Ali, where use of the phrase "The Greatest," in connection with
an offensive, nude caricature of a boxer, 6 had been sufficient to establish
identity.2' The dissent protested that the majority approach would result in
the removal of standard phrases from the language by their mere association
with a public figure.2" Again, the basic difference is in the perception of the
nature of the use. The dissent treats Carson as an information case, but that
position really misses the boat. For anyone in touch with American culture,
what was intended and achieved was a taking of the value of an aspect of a
famous person's personality for advertising purposes - the classic right of

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).

Id. at 833.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 836.
Id. at 834 n. 1 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117
(4th ed. 1971)).
225. Carson, 698 F.2d at 835.
226. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
227. Carson, 698 F.2d at 835.
228. Id. at 837 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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publicity infringement which has been actionable since the time of Mr.
Pavesich.
Two further cases are worthy of mention on the identification issue. In the
"sound alike" case of Midler v. Ford Motor Co. , an advertising company
wanted to use the song "Do You Want to Dance," which the singer Bette
Midler had made a hit, in a commercial for Ford cars. The license for the
song itself was available, but Ms. Midler turned down the request for
permission to use her version. Not willing to abandon a good idea, the agency
contacted Ula Hedwig, a singer who had been a back-up vocalist for Ms.
Midler, and asked her to sing the song for a new recording, with instructions
"to 'sound as much as possible like the Bette Midler record.' "1 Ms.
Hedwig's success in this performance led Ms. Midler to sue under California
law when the commercial aired on television.
The defendants pointed out that they were in literal compliance with the
California statute because they had not used the "name, voice, signature,
photograph or likeness" of Ms. Midler,u3 but rather had used the voice of
Ms. Hedwig. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument.
Noting that section 3344 of the California Civil Code did not repeal the
California common law of privacy and publicity, the court reasoned by
analogy to paragraph (b) of Civil Code section 990 that the common-law
publicity right of living people was also one of property. The court held that
the common-law right of publicity protected against "an appropriation of the
attributes of one's identity," 232 and that what the defendants had clearly
sought by using a sound-alike in these circumstances was the commercial
association with "an attribute of Midler's identity. "nz 3 The Midler decision
also helped to provoke the addition of voice as a protected category under the
New York privacy statutes. 4
Identity was also an important question in the Vanna White case,
discussed above in the information and free speech context. Ms. White was
unsuccessful in her suit at the district court level, as District Judge Ronald

229. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 951 (1992); see also Sharon
Chester-Taxin, Will the Real Bette Midler Please Stand Up? The Futureof Celebrity Sound-Alike
Recordings, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 165 (1992); Glancy, supra note 89; Wohl,
supra note 212.
230. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461.
231. Id. at 463 (quoting CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1996)).
232. Id. (quoting Motschenbacherv. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir.
1974)).
233. Id. Ms. Midler's triumph spilled over to help another singer, Tom Waits. He won a
similar sound-alike case, also in the Ninth Circuit, even though the song used in the commercial
was only inspired by a well known Waits hit, and was not the hit itself. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,
978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1080 (1993).
234. See note 70 and accompanying text.
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S.W. Lew granted summary judgment to the defendants in an unreported
decision. 5 Applying the statutory articulation with some literalness, he
found that the advertisement had not used Ms. White's "likeness" within the
meaning of the California's Civil Code section 3344.1 6 For similar reasons,
he held that the advertisement had not infringed her common-law right of
publicity. The robot simply was not a likeness of the performer.237 Judge
Lew also found against a claim based on the law of unfair competition. 8
On appeal the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed.239 On the
publicity question, it held that the California common-law right must be
construed more broadly. In light of the never-ending quest of commercial
enterprises to borrow the associative value of celebrities, it would be a mistake
to adopt too narrow a concept of what attributes of personality should be
protected.24 The majority noted:
[These cases] teach the impossibility of treating the right of publicity as
guarding only against a laundry list of specific means of appropriating
identity. A rule which says that the right of publicity can be infringed only
through the use of nine different methods of appropriating identity merely

challenges the clever advertising strategist to come up with the tenth. 241
Implicit in this approach is the recognition that the articulated rule can never
fully cover all instances of a taking recognized by some other cognitive
process. A good judge or jury will know a violation when presented with one
and must be trusted to do so.
In the end, Ms. White won a pyrrhic victory. On January 19, 1994, a Los
Angeles jury awarded her $403,000 in damages, down from her original
request of $6.9 million. Attorneys for Samsung, perhaps somewhat selfservingly, called the verdict a "win."2 4 2

What generalizations can be drawn from these cases? In almost all of
them there was an admitted or patent desire to gain advertising value for an
unrelated product through an association with a well-known figure. These were
not coincidences. The fact that the association was by use of an unusual
attribute did not prevent the courts from cutting through the technicalities.

235. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. CV-88-06499-RSWL (C.D. Cal. 19_).
236. White, 971 F.2d at 1397.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1399.
239. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
240. Id. at 1397-99 (citing Carson, Motschenbacher,and Midler).
241. Id. at 1398.
242. Shauna Snow, MorningReport, Los ANGELE TIMES, January 21, 1994, at F2, Entertainment Desk; see Ellen J. Pollock, Vanna White Wins Suit, WALL ST. J., January 27, 1994, at B2.
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Basically, the defendants were trying to get something for nothing, and both
the express law and the promptings of fairness and justice recognized that the
something belonged to someone else.243 Notwithstanding the concerns of the
Carson and White dissents, judges and juries have been able to readily identify
examples of actionable behavior and remain unlikely to let the principle run
amuck. They seem to justify the confidence expressed by Justice Cobb in
Pavesich.24
VI. THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS AND THE MCCARTHY TREATISE:
TWO MORE ATTEMPTS AT CLARITY

Before leaving the doctrinal history underlying the Restatement (Third)of
Unfair Competition, it is worth examining two other attempts to bring a clear,
workable definition to the law of identity: the ALI's work on Privacy in The
Restatement (Second) of Torts,245 and J. Thomas McCarthy's treatise, The
Rights of Publicity and Privacy.246 As the only prior ALI effort in this area,
the Restatement of Torts sections on privacy deserve particular attention.
A. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
The Restatement of Torts formulation followed Prosser's four torts,
although somewhat reordered and reorganized. The four, as listed in
section 652A, consist of:
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another... ;
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness... ;
(c) unreasonable publicity given to another's private life ...

; and

(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the
public ..

247

The right against the appropriation of name or likeness sweeps into its
grasp most of what the right of publicity would also cover. Its more complete
Restatement of Torts formulation reads:

243. See generally Margolin, supra note 211.
244. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.

245.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS,

246.

MCCARTHY,

247.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS,

supra note 28.

supra note 28.

supra note 28, § 652A(2).
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§ 652C. Appropriation of Name or Likeness.
One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness2 48of
another is subject to liability for the other for invasion of his privacy.
One immediately apparent problem with this formulation is the overly narrow
use of "name or likeness" to describe the non-appropriable indicia of identity
covered by the rule. Other problems emerge in the comments, and the
potential overlap with the publicity approach becomes clear. Comment a reads:
The interest protected by the rule stated in this Section is the interest
of the individual in the exclusive use of his own identity, in so far as it is
represented by his name or likeness, and in so far as the use may be of
benefit to him or to others. Although the protection of his personal feelings
against mental distress is an important factor leading to a recognition of the
rule, the right created by it is in the nature of a property right, for the
exercise of which an exclusive license may be given to a third person,
which will entitle the licensee to maintain an action to protect it. 249
Mental distress baggage, while mentioned in a bow to history, is not made a
necessity. The distinction is made, then declared essentially irrelevant.
Likewise, while still defimitionally a tort, the right "is in the nature of a
property right," which may be transferred to third parties. In these two ways,
the note baldly recognizes the inadequacies of a tort formulation for this
branch of Prosser's approach, but nevertheless leaves the identification of the
right as a tort intact.
In the next comment, the Restatement of Torts at least tries to liberate
itself from the trap posed by the word "commercial." By citing, however, "a
commercial purpose" as part of the "common form" of this branch of the tort,
the Restatement continued to perpetuate use of this confusing term:
How invaded. The common form of invasion of privacy under the rule
here stated is the appropriation and use of the plaintiffs name or likeness
to advertise the defendant's business or product, or for some similar
commercial purpose. Apart from statute, however, the rule stated is not
limited to commercial appropriation. It applies also when the defendant
makes use of the plaintiffs name or likeness for his own purposes and
benefit, even though the use is not a commercial one, and even though the
benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one. Statutes in some
states have, however, limited the liability to commercial uses of the name
or likeness.350

248. Id. § 652C.

249. Id. § 652C cmt. a.
250. Id. § 652C cmt. b.
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This same problem appears in comment d, where the distinction between
for-profit advertising, icon, and performance uses, on the one hand, and forprofit information and creative uses, on the other, is properly made, but where
the "commercial" label in opposition to "incidental" is confusingly perpetuated
to describe the split.
Incidental use of name or likeness. The value of the plaintiff's name

is not appropriated by mere mention of it, or by reference to it in
connection with legitimate mention of his public activities; nor is the value
of his likeness appropriated when it is published for purposes other than
taking advantage of his reputation, prestige, or other value associated with
him, for purposes of publicity. No one has the right to object merely
because his name or his appearance is brought before the public, since
neither is in any way a private matter and both are open to public
observation. It is only when the publicity is given for the purpose of
appropriating to the defendant's benefit the commercial or other values
associated with the name or the likeness that the right of privacy is
invaded. The fact that the defendant is engaged in the business of
publication, for example of a newspaper, out of which he makes or seeks
to make a profit, is not enough to make the incidental publication a
commercial use of the name or likeness. Thus a newspaper, although it is
not a philanthropic institution, does not become liable under the rule stated
in this Section to every person whose name or likeness it publishes.',
A strength of the more generalized approach of the Restatement of Torts
to an appropriation tort is the broad recognition that identity has value, and
that it is the taking of such value that must be regulated.
Appropriation. In order that there may be liability under the rule stated,
in this Section, the defendant must have appropriated to his own use or
benefit the reputation, prestige, social or commercial standing, public
interest or other values of the plaintiff's name or likeness. It is not enough
that the defendant has adopted for himself a name that is the same as that
of the plaintiff, so long as he does not pass himself off as the plaintiff or
otherwise seek to obtain for himself the values or benefits of the plaintiffs
name or identity.... Until the value of the name has in some way been
appropriated, there is no tort. z
The Restatement of Torts deals with descendibility in section 6521. True
to its tort mold, the right is viewed generally as dying with the individual
depicted. It does make a grudging exception for the descendibility of the

251. Id. § 652C cmt. d.
252. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 28, § 652C cmt. c.
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appropriation right, although there is an arguable implication that this can only
be accomplished by statute, and not in a common-law formulation.
§ 6521. Personal Character of Right of Privacy
Except for the appropriation of one's name or likeness, an action for
invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a living individual whose
privacy is invaded. 3
The comments explain further:
The right protected by the action for invasion of privacy is a personal
right, peculiar to the individual whose privacy is invaded. The cause of
action is not assignable, and it cannot be maintained by other persons such
as members of the individual's family, unless their own privacy is invaded
along with his. The only exception to this rule involves the appropriation
4
to the defendant's own use of another's name or likeness.25
In the absence of statute, the action for the invasion of privacy cannot
be maintained after the death of the individual whose privacy is invaded.
In a few states particular statutes permit the survival of an action for
invasion of privacy that has occurred before death. In a smaller number of
states there is statutory authorization for an action on the part of surviving
relatives for invasion of the privacy of one who is already deceased, with
the invasion occurring after his death. Since appropriation of name or
likeness is similar to impairment of a property right and involves an aspect
of unjust enrichment of the defendants [sic] or his estate, survival rights
may be held to exist following the death of either party.25
The Restatement of Torts made some progress from the original Prosser
approach, but the tort formulation was still too confusing. Only by outright
denial of several of its expected attributes could it begin to deal with identity
more broadly. Essentially, it was a well-explained continuation of "ghoti.,, 6
B. The McCarthy Treatise
J. Thomas McCarthy, a professor of law at the University of San
Francisco, has devoted considerable attention and clarity of thought to the
rights of privacy and publicity. His treatise, The Rights of Publicity and
Privacy,57 was first published by Clark Boardman in 1987 and has been

253. Id. § 6521.
254. Id. § 6521 cmt. a (citation omitted).

255. Id. § 6521 cmt. b.
256. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
257. McCARTHY, supra note 28.
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updated periodically since. It provides in many ways the clearest examination
of the issues discussed here, as well as an appropriately exhaustive state-bystate survey of the law and treatment of the day-to-day issues of practice and
procedure. The overall quality of McCarthy's text has greatly simplified work
in the area, and this article owes much to the insights of his work. For all its
virtues, however, the treatise doesn't get us to "fish" either.
As to coverage, the book is quite comprehensive. As to bringing
cohesiveness "and structure to a disorganized body of law, " s it takes
significant steps but remains bound to some extent by the confusing definitions
of the past. The work is very clear in tracing the emergence of publicity from
privacy and in untangling their heavily intertwined natures, 9 a point the
importance of which McCarthy expressly underlined:
To my knowledge, this is the first legal treatise to place primary focus
on the Right of Publicity .... While the main focus of this treatise is the
Right of Publicity, the various forms of "privacy" rights are highlighted
and compared with the Right of Publicity throughout the book. When I
began the research for this book, I blithely assumed that I could confine
it strictly to the Right of Publicity. I quickly found that because of the
close historical and practical links between privacy rights and the Right of
Publicity, both required detailed discussion....

The exact shape and

contours of both the Right of Publicity and the various types of privacy are
still not widely understood. I found the best way to describe the content of
these rights was to compare them with each other and with other related
and more familiar legal concepts. 26°
One failing of his discussion is the continued use of the term "commercial," with all of its confusing baggage, as a term of operative distinguishing
power. To his credit, however, his use is internally more consistent than most.
For instance, the term appears in his most basic definition of publicity:
The Right of Publicity is simply this: the inherent right of every human
being to control the commercial use of his or her identity. This legal right
is infringed by unpermitted use which damages the commercial value of
this inherent human right of identity and which is not immunized by
principles of free press and free speech. Neither the false implication of an
endorsement, nor likely confusion as to commercial source, nor celebrity
261
status of the person is required to trigger potential liability.

258. Id.at vii.
259. Id.at ch. 1.
260. Id. at viii.
261. Id. at vii.
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While "commercial use" itself is not expressly defined, care is taken to define
use in a "commercial setting" that "denotes use of personal identity in
advertising or promotion or in connection with the actual goods and services
themselves" 2 62-what this article calls advertising and icon uses. He contrasts
this use with what he calls "media," which he defines as "a use of personal
identity which has a reasonable relationship with the normal content of the
'media': news, commentary on public issues, fiction, and entertainment." 263
His media use thus covers both informational and creative uses in the
definitional structure of this article.
While McCarthy thus gets the distinctions largely right, he is still using
potentially confusing terms, a problem he himself recognizes: "Of course, the
bare labels 'media' and 'commercial setting' are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. Media are always 'commercial' in a free enterprise economy, and
advertising usually appears in the 'media.'"26 In his favor, the law frequently bends terms from their common meanings, converting them into terms of
art, and McCarthy is at least quite explicit about what he is doing. Where a
term of art has so manifestly been a source of confusion, however, it would
perhaps be best to jettison it in a discussion that is intended to bring coherent
structure to a disorganized subject. Still, McCarthy at least sorts out the
different values given in society and the courts to information and creative
uses, on the one hand, and advertising and icon uses on the other. 26
McCarthy recognized that further development in the law is inevitable:
[T]he history of the Right of Publicity is hardly over. Like a statue
emerging from the formless block of stone, it is still rough-hewn. Much

work remains before we will have a legal right of polished contours. And
like any legal right, it will never be "finished." It remains for each
generation to adapt it to their own society and values. 26
As an avowed publicity scholar, he also showed an admirable willingness
to meld the tunes of privacy and publicity:
Undoubtedly, the law today would be more coherent and neat if it had
developed such that courts would recognize a sui generis legal right labeled
something like a "right of identity" with damages measured by both mental
distress and commercial loss. If the law had such a separately entitled
category, things would be considerably easier to sort out compared to our

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

McCarthy, supra note 28, § 7.1[A].
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at chs. 7 & 8.
McCarthy, supra note 28, § 1.11[B].
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present world of "separate" rights of privacy by appropriation and a Right
267
of Publicity.
All too often in the history of these rights, scholars have gotten irretrievably
committed to their paradigm of particular passion. Prosser, for instance,
stepped confidently into this trap with his "four torts" formulation. McCarthy
clearly sees the limitations of the chopped up right that the accidents of history
have produced.
It is unfortunate that in this moment of greatest insight McCarthy does not
go the next step and actually propose, in some detail, a formulation for such
a sui generis fight. The problem is clearly delineated; the solution is withheld.
To his credit, this failure of boldness is intentional. His restraint is rooted in
a modest realism about the role of a scholar and not in timidity:
I have tried clearly and consistently to label my personal opinions as
Author's Comments, so that the reader is not misled by the difference
between "the law" and my own view of what the law should or could be.
I strongly believe that it would do a disservice to attorneys if the author
were to confuse the reality of the law with the author's subjective views.
Author's opinions are ubiquitous in this work, largely because the treatise
covers many areas of relatively new and untested legal concepts. Of
course, my own comments are not "law" and can become law only if they
have sufficient persuasiveness to influence practitioners and judges:
[P]rofessors are not "lawmakers" in the same sense as judges:
Judges can make law by the stroke of a pen; they have power
because they have authority. Academics, by contrast, have
influence measured only by the force of their ideas. If those ideas
persuade judges, lawyers, and other scholars, then professors will
have influence on doctrine; if their ideas are unpersuasive, then the
academics are powerless.
Apart from my Comments, I have endeavored to make the legal
discussions objective and pragmatic, keeping in mind Justice Holmes's
simple definition, "The prophecies of what the courts will268do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the Law.
Nonetheless, in order to progress beyond outworn formulations, the law needs
a template, a new articulation around which the workings of the courts can
coalesce, a new metaphor to liberate the thinking. McCarthy declined to offer

267. Id. § 1.11[C] (footnote omitted).

268. Id. at viii (quoting A. Douglas Melamed & David Westin, Anti Intellectual History, 90
YALE L.J. 1497, 1507 (1981) and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.
L. REV. 457 (1896)).
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such a template in his treatise. 2 9 The drafters of the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition got the next chance.
VII. EVALUATING THE RESTATEMENT APPROACH TO PUBLICITY

The Restatement's approach to publicity is deceptively simple. There are
only four sections for the whole topic. Only two sections are necessary to
define the basic right, albeit with considerable elaboration in the comments and
notes. The remaining two are devoted to remedies.
A. Section 46
The topic is introduced in section 46, entitled "Appropriation of the
Commercial Value of a Person's Identity: The Right of Publicity." It reads:
One who appropriates the commercial value of a person's identity by using
without consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for
purposes of trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate under the
rules stated in [sections] 48 and 49.270

This statement has three principal components. The first declares that the
subject matter of the right is "the commercial value of a person's identity." A
violation only takes place, however, if there is use of "the person's name,
likeness or other indicia of identity" (the second part) "for purposes of trade"
(the third). Under this formulation, the right may be characterized in the first
part, but it depends on the combination of the second and third for its
operation. As a logical matter, this structure leaves open the question of
whether the appropriation of commercial values of identity through some
means other than a use for the purposes of trade might be possible and even
permissible. As a practical matter, this is a quibble, but it does suggest a
certain looseness in the structure of distinctions.
The two operative parts beg clarification. What are "indicia of identity?"
What are "purposes of trade?" Of the two, only "for the purposes of trade"
gets a full definitional treatment, which is discussed with section 47 below.
The "indicia of identity" concept relies on the comments to section 46 for
elaboration. Comment d provides some concrete examples: "In most cases an
appropriation of identity is accomplished through the use of a person's name

269. Indeed, in his 1995 Manges Lecture at Columbia University, he even allowed himself to
slip back into repeating the tired old mental distress-commercial injury differences between
privacy and publicity. J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture-The
Human Personaas Commercial Property:The Rightof Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
129, 134 (1995) [hereinafter McCarthy Speech].
270. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 46.
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or likeness. The person can be identified by a real name, nickname, or
professional name, or by a likeness embodied in a photograph, drawing, film,
or physical look-alike." 27' Comment d goes on to point out that imitation of
a distinctive voice or performing persona can also violate the right of
publicity. Representing an advance over many statutes and the Restatement of
Torts, the indicia are not limited to name and likeness. Along the lines of the
Carson, Motschenbacher, and Vanna White cases, the comment leaves open
a finding of an infringement in the use of other identifying characteristics or
attributes, "but only if they are so closely and uniquely associated with the
identity of a particular individual that their use enables the defendant to
appropriate the commercial value of the person's identity."272 In trying thus
to limit other such possible characteristics, however, the comment falls back
on circularity: it uses the end result of appropriating commercial value as a
part of the definition of how one appropriates commercial value. While we
probably know what the Reporters mean, particularly in light of the application
in prior cases, such a direct resort to tautology in defining one of the two key
elements in the operation of the right is hardly encouraging.
More fundamentally, the comments to section 46 address the similarity to
privacy and set forth a purported basis for a distinction. Comment a explains:
Scope. This Topic addresses the common law and statutory rules that
protect the commercial value of a person's identity. The appropriation of
another's identity for purposes of trade can result in injury to both
commercial and personal interests. This Restatement deals with rules
affording relief against unfair methods of competition, and the rules stated
in this Topic are therefore limited to the redress of commercial injuries.
The interest protected by these rules is often described as the "right of
publicity." Relief is also generally available under the law of torts for
injuries to personal interests caused by the unauthorized commercial use
of another's identity. The protection of these personal interests is often
described as an aspect of the "right of privacy."273
Comment b adds: "The distinction between the publicity and privacy actions,
however, relates primarily to the nature of the harm suffered by the plaintiff;
similar substantive rules govern the determination of liability."274 The
difference then, at least as expressed here, goes back to the old distinction
between personal harm and interests, on the one hand, and "commercial"
harm and interests on the other. The comment ignores the key problems with
this distinction: How does one tell these two definitional poles apart in the

271. Id.§ 46 cmt. d.
272. Id.

273. Id. § 46 cmt. a.
274. Id. § 46 cmt. b.
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subjective experience of the plaintiff, and why should they be divided between
two causes of action?
The comments to section 46 undercut their case for maintaining a
distinction between privacy and publicity by recognizing the largely common
attributes of the two supposedly distinct rights. In addition to the recognition
in comment b that "similar substantive rules govern the determination of
liability," comment a notes: "Although not directly applicable, the rules stated
here may be useful by analogy in evaluating claims under the right of privacy
arising from an unauthorized commercial exploitation of a person's identity.,,I Furthermore, the Restatement authors are fully aware that the division
of personal and commercial interests is at odds with the Prosser formula for
appropriation privacy adopted in the Restatement of Torts: "The 'appropriation' tort as described by Prosser and the Restatement, Second, of Torts
subsumes harm to both personal and commercial interests caused by an
unauthorized exploitation of the plaintiffs identity. ,276
Nonetheless, citing the prior history of the tort-based limitations that gave
publicity its original impetus, and ignoring the explicit efforts of the
Restatement of Torts to address this, the comment declares that the privacypublicity distinction was made by courts along the harms-to-interests line, and
that it is worth maintaining.
Classification of the tort as an aspect of the right of privacy, however, led
some courts to deny relief to well-known personalities whose celebrity
precluded the allegations of injury to solitude or personal feelings normally
associated with an invasion of privacy. The historical connection with
personal privacy also impeded the transfer of rights in the commercial
value of a person's identity. Courts in a number of jurisdictions eventually
came to distinguish claims for injury to personal feelings caused by an
unauthorized use of the plaintiff's identity from claims seeking redress for
an appropriation of the commercial value of the identity. The latter claim
was sometimes denominated a "right of publicity" to distinguish it from
the protection available to personal interests under the "right of privacy.,277
Awkward and artificial though it may be, the privacy-publicity split
remains in the Restatement, with privacy pushed back into the domain of
"personal" and not "commercial" harms. The casting of privacy in its most
restrictive, pre-Restatement form is at least consistently applied. For instance,
comment g to section 46 states that "the personal interests protected under the

275.

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 22, § 46 cmt. a.

276. Id. § 46 emt. b.
277. Id.
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right of privacy are not transferable,"278 even though comment a to
section 6521 of the Restatement of Torts expressly permitted transferability for
appropriation privacy.2 79

B. Section 47
The second operational element, "use for the purpose of trade," gets
direct definitional treatment in section 47, appropriately enough entitled "Uses
for Purposes of Trade:"
The name, likeness and other indicia of a person's identity are used "for
purposes of trade" under the rule stated in [section] 46 if they are used in
advertising the user's goods or services, or are placed on merchandise
marketed by the user, or are used in connection with services rendered by
the user. However, use "for purposes of trade" does not ordinarily include
the use of a person's identity in news reporting, commentary, entertainment, works0 of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental to
28
such uses.
The first part of this definition is the affirmative inclusion of advertising and
icon uses in the potentially actionable activity. While there are still some lines
to be drawn, this is a relatively unequivocal statement that is fairly congruent
with the distinctions made in the application of the law to prior cases. Less
clear, however, is the imperfect exclusion of news, fiction, etc. from
"purposes of trade." Such uses are "not ordinarily" included as a use "for the
purposes of trade," but are not categorically excluded. Here, we see once
again the old problem of using a commercial-trade definition to mean
"actionable." It is true that icon, advertising and performance uses are most
frequently actionable; and that information and creative uses most frequently
are not. But by using "for purposes of trade" as the operative language, it is
necessary to leave the door open to the fact that information and creative uses
might be for the purpose of trade, thus denying the characterization any
consistently applicable distinguishing value.
This is somewhat clarified by the comments. Comment c, for instance,
repeats, once again, the caution that just because an informational or creative
use is for profit, it is not necessarily "for purposes of trade," sensible though
such a conclusion might be based on normal understanding of the phrase.2"'

278. Id. § 46 cmt. g.
279. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 28, § 6521 cmt. a.
280. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 47.
281. Id. § 47 cmt. c ("The fact that the publisher or other user seeks or is successful in
obtaining a commercial advantage from an otherwise permitted use of another's identity does not
render the appropriation actionable.").

Published by Scholar Commons, 1996

63

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 7
[Vol. 47:709

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

It also suggests that essentially no informational use will invade the right of
publicity. Because "[t]he right of publicity as recognized by statute and
common law is fundamentally constrained by the public and constitutional
interest in freedom of expression," 2" the Restatement simply puts all
informational, and most creative, uses outside of an action under the right of
publicity. The often mentioned falsehood exception is dealt with by allocating
it to another right altogether, back into "false light" privacy.
Some cases indicate that the right to use another's identity in news
reports and similar works may be forfeited if the work contains substantial
falsifications. Such cases, however, are more appropriately regarded as
actions for defamation or for invasion of privacy by placing the plaintiff
in a false light rather than for infringement of the right of publicity. When
the imposition of liability turns on the truth or falsity of the defendant's
statements, the defendant is also entitled to the constitutional safeguards
that have been incorporated into the law of defamation and false light
privacy. 283
This definitional side-step thankfully does not include the word "commercial,"
and it may solve the short term problems coming from the categorical
exclusion of informational uses from publicity. However, it does so by
contradicting the Restatement's original premise for separating publicity from
privacy-i. e., the nature of the harm or protected interest. Here, in contrast,
the distinction is expressly one of use, without regard to the nature of the
harm. This kind of internal contradiction reflects yet again the basic unworkability of the privacy-publicity distinction.
Comment c makes a sensible distinction between a true informational or
creative use and an advertising or icon use in disguise:
However, if the name or likeness is used solely to attract attention to a
work that is not related to the identified person, the user may be subject
to liability for a use of the other's identity in advertising. Similarly, if a
photograph of the plaintiff is included in the defendant's publication merely
for the purpose of appropriating the plaintiff's commercial value as a
model rather than as part of a news or other communicative use, the
defendant may be subject to liability for a merchandising use of the
plaintiff's identity.284
Returning to the core operational language of section 47, there is some
history, particularly in New York, concerning the phrase "for the purpose of

282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. (citations omitted).
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trade," which may confuse matters. The use of this same phrase in section 51
of the New York Civil Rights Law2" has been relied upon by some courts
to provide an avenue for including "media," i.e., informational and creative
uses, in actionable territory. Recall the language in the Paulsen case: "A far
more restrictive treatment, however, has been accorded the proscription
against use 'for the purposes of trade,' particularly where the use has been in
furtherance of the business of a communications medium."286 If it is necessary to remove for-profit media uses via the comments, it is equally necessary
to point out that "for purposes of trade" also includes non-profit uses, which
by most normal definitions would not constitute "trade": "Unauthorized use
of a person's identity in solicitations for contributions or memberships by nonprofit entities such as charitable, educational, governmental, fraternal, and
religious organizations also constitutes a use for purpose of trade."2"7
Even after including only advertising and icon uses in the ordinary
meaning of "purpose of trade," and then grudgingly including, then largely
excluding, information and creative uses as potentially extraordinary meanings,
a further problem with this definitional structure remains. It leaves undiscussed
the use that was held actionable in the only United States Supreme Court case
directly on publicity: the performance use at issue in Zacchini.8 8 Once again
the comments deal with this issue, grouping performance, at least by
implication, with information and creative uses as a seldom-actionable
category:
The right of publicity has been extended in a few cases beyond advertising
and merchandising uses to other substantial appropriations of a person's
identity. Liability has been imposed, for example, in connection with an
unauthorized broadcast of the plaintiffs performance or a sustained
imitation of the plaintiffs performing style or performing persona that is
marked by the defendant as a simulation of the plaintiff's perfor289
mance.

This treatment of performance is at odds with the fact that in Zacchini, the
operative distinction between the majority and minority positions was whether
performance or information attributes predominated. In dealing with
performance, the comments do recognize the potential usefulness of analogies
to copyright law in fleshing out the right in this area. 2" The Zacchini court
also noted this analogy: "The Constitution no more prevents a State from
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
Paulsen, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 505-06.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 47 cmt a.
See McCarthy Speech, supra note 269, at 133.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 47, cmt. d.
Id.
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requiring respondent to compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on
television than it would privilege respondent to film and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the copyright owner . ... 291
C. Remedies: Sections 48 and 49
The Restatement contains two sections on remedies, sections 48 and 49,
addressing the award of injunctive and monetary relief, respectively. Both
contain fairly similar lists of multiple, relatively obvious, non-exclusive factors
to be balanced in some unquantifiable comparison in determining what relief
may be appropriate. As checklists of what might be considered by a court
arriving at an essentially subjective result, they are somewhat useful. As
guides to predicting results, they are severely limited. 2
One interesting omission from the main text of section 49 is punitive
damages of any kind, although this gap is closed in comment e, which refers
to the Restatement of Torts section 908 and to the various statutes which allow
for a punitive awards. 2 9 More problematic, the comments to the remedy
sections bring explicit tort references back to the characterization of publicity.
In the language of sections 46 and 47, the drafters, mindful in comment b to
section 46 of the tort baggage inflicted on privacy, avoided any express
mention of publicity as a tort. In the comments to sections 48 and 49,
however, not only are numerous references made to tort rules for guidance,
but most tellingly, explicit reference is made in comment b to section 49 to
"[tihe history of the publicity tort and its relationship to other causes of
action." 294 As the Restatement itself recognized elsewhere, the baggage that
comes with viewing publicity as a tort is potentially great. It further recognized that some of the difficulties with the tort characterization led to the first
articulation of publicity in Haelan. The Restatement distanced the whole unfair
competition concept from torts in its introduction. 9 Why should the drafters
drag torts back into the Restatement via the remedies sections? This phenomenon is perhaps explained by sloppiness and a failure to coordinate among the
drafters. It is to be hoped that courts will be cautious at taking such a tort
characterization too seriously. Publicity should follow its own logic, and
should no longer be forced into conformity with pre-existing doctrinal
structures which do not necessarily suit it. Nonetheless, for those looking to
re-import tort attributes into publicity, the door has been left open.296
291. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575 (citations omitted).
292. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, §§ 48-49.
293. Id. § 49 cmt. e.
294. Id. § 49 cmt. b (emphasis added).
295. Id. at XI ("it was eventually decided that the law of unfair competition had evolved to the
point that it was no longer appropriate to treat it as a subcategory of the law of Torts").
296. In the Foreword appearing at the beginning of this volume, Robert C. Denicola and
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D. Avoiding Confusion With Other Unfair Competition Concepts
Happily, the Restatement treatment of the right of publicity has sought to
slam the door on borrowing unhelpful attributes from one possible neighboring
field of law-unfair competition. Publicity, after all, appears in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition. The infection of publicity by elements
from other doctrines in the same book has an almost parasitic inevitability to
it. Nonetheless, the publicity drafters have gone to considerable length to
negate two of the most likely suspects for such infection: prior use and
likelihood of confusion. Regarding prior use, comment b to section 46
implicitly denies the need for it by citing the protection due non-celebrities:
Some decisions suggest that an unauthorized use of a person's identity
for purposes of trade injures only commercial interests if plaintiff is a
celebrity and only personal interests if the plaintiff is not well known.
However, celebrities are not precluded from establishing cognizable injury
to personal interests in addition to commercial loss, nor are less wellknown plaintiffs precluded from establishing commercial loss in addition
to injury to personal interests, whether recoverable through a single or
297
companion causes of action.
Comment d is similar:
Appropriationof identity. The right of publicity protects the commercial value of a person's identity. The right is most often invoked to protect
the value associated with the identity of a celebrity, and a few cases appear
to require some minimum degree of fame or notoriety as a prerequisite for
relief. However, the identity of even an unknown person may possess
commercial value. Thus, an evaluation of the relative fame of the plaintiff
is more properly relevant to the determination of appropriate relief.298
In Comment b to section 46, the question of confusion as to origin is dealt
with expressly, and the contrast to trademark and other related branches of
unfair competition made explicit.
Proof of deception or consumer confusion is not required for the
imposition of liability under this [s]ection. However, a person's name or
likeness may be protectable as a trademark if it has become distinctive of

Harvey S. Perlman, the Reporters for the Restatement, at footnote 28 offer the reminder that even
if a right is classified in property, its violation may consitute a tort. While I believe that this
distinction is not a necessary implication of the use of the term "publicity tort" in the
Restatement, the clarification implicit in footnote 28 is nonetheless welcome.
297. Id. § 46 cmt. b.
298. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 46 cmt. d (citations omitted).
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the goods or services emanating from a particular commercial source.
Unauthorized use of such a trademark in a manner likely to cause
confusion regarding the source or sponsorship of goods or services will
subject the user to liability for trademark infringement under the rule stated
in [section] 20. Similarly, the unauthorized use of another's name or
likeness in marketing goods or services can subject the user to liability for
deceptive marketing under the rule stated in [section] 4 if the use is likely
person
to cause prospective purchasers to believe that the identified
299
endorses or is otherwise connected with the goods or services.
Hopefully, future judges, legislators and commentators will take to heart these
clear warnings against careless importation of the broader concepts of unfair
competition law into publicity, notwithstanding their appearance in the same
Restatement.
E. Descendibility
Another topic handled well by the Restatement is the question of
descendibility. Comment h to section 46 notes the still somewhat unsettled
nature of the question:
Duration of rights. Many jurisdictions have not yet considered the
descendibility of the right of publicity. Of those jurisdictions that have
determined the issue through legislation or common law adjudication, the
the assertion
majority recognize the right as descendible, while in others
3 °
of post-mortem rights is precluded by statute or case law. 00
Even where descendibility is recognized, the Restatement suggests that the
post-mortem right may be a bit less restrictive, thus permitting a broader
30
latitude in creative use, for instance, such as under the California statute. '
As to the length of a post-mortem right, the Restatement is quite
perceptive. Absent a statute fixing some relatively bright-line, and necessarily
arbitrary, term of years, the ever diminishing nature of the values provides a
kind of internal and automatic period: "The practical duration of post mortem
rights is ordinarily limited by the diminishing commercial value of a person's
identity in the period after death. In addition, the exercise of post mortem
rights by heirs or legatees is subject to the traditional equitable principles of
laches and estoppel. "3 If the persona is still worth taking and fighting over,
perhaps the right still exists.

299. Id. § 46 cmt. b (citation omitted).
300. Id. § 46 cmt. h.
301. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(n) (West Supp. 1996).
302. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 46 cmt. h.
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F. Justifications
The Restatement, in comment c to section 46, recites a series of
rationales, largely culled from the cases cited in the accompanying reporters'
note, for the protection of the right of publicity. They include: (1) the
"individual's interest in personal dignity and autonomy;" (2) recognizing the
commercial value of fame and preventing unjust enrichment; (3) preventing
excessive use that might dilute the value of the identity; (4) preventing
confusion about endorsement; and (5) providing an incentive to cultivate fame
and image-desirability. 3 The list is taken with a grain of salt, however:
"The rationales underlying recognition of a right of publicity are generally less
compelling than those that justify rights in trademarks or trade secrets ...
Thus, courts may be properly reluctant to adopt a broad construction of the
publicity right." 3" This kind of tepid endorsement of underlying justifications is intriguing in the context of a first inclusion of the right in a Restatement.
G. The Evaluation:Is It "Fish" Yet?
So how did the Restatement drafters do? They have at least gotten a
relatively clear statement of traditional publicity concepts into a Restatement.
Nonetheless, there are still too many internal contradictions and unhelpful
definitions at the core of the enterprise to call it is a real success. Returning
to the opening analogy, the drafters keep on trying to spell fish using the old,
largely unsatisfactory, definitional structures: the legal equivalents of "gh,"
"o," and "ti." With enough explanation and a certain generous inattention to
consistency, that kind of spelling can work, more or less. It is, to be sure, an
improvement over "x," "ql," and "ap." The Restatement drafters, to their
credit, make their approach to publicity work, at least internally, by using the
comments to clarify the inadequacies of their operative definitions. What they
missed was the chance to step back and try out some new letters, some new
descriptive and operational distinctions, which might have fit the history and
aspirations of the doctrine with less bending, tearing, and gluing back
together. They also missed the chance to rise to McCarthy's challenge of
building a sui generis right. Caution prevailed; the old metaphors still enslaved
their thoughts."

303. Id. § 46 cmt. c.
304. Id.
305. In the Foreword, the Reporters explain that "given a clean slate, we too might have
selected a different linguistic formulation . . . ." The Reporters recognize, in effect, their lack
of boldness, but suggest that such boldness was not theirs to exercise. It is exactly in this limited
conception of the role of a Restatement that they and I disagree.
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But it is not enough simply to recite this opportunity lost. A completed
critique of the Restatement's efforts must suggest how a better job might be
done. Having complained of repeated failures to provide a new descriptive
template, I now propose such a description. Of course, my efforts are open to
criticism and improvement. Still, I may be able to get close enough to
"physch" to remind courts, legislators, and scholars that a better job still waits
to be done.
VIII. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: "PHYSCH?"
In proposing a new "Restatement of the Right of Identity," a number of
factors have informed my approach. My starting point is McCarthy's idea that
a sui generis, unified right of identity is needed.3"' In fleshing out such a
right, however, it is wise to seek greater specificity within smaller, more
numerous categories, rather than a small number of overarching generalities.
The "Langdellian" approach could always be tempted by a conclusory, catchall phrase that could then lead to confusion (just think of the emphasis given
to "consideration" in the contract formulation which Langdell himself helped
to put together). 7 Rather, I take to heart a piece of the "realist" program,
summed up by Karl N. Llewellyn in 1931: "There is a strong tendency to
think it wiser to narrow rather than to widen the categories308 in which concepts
and rules either aboutjudging orfor judging are made."
Instead of broad concepts of interests and harms, I start with the five use
distinctions laid out at the beginning of this article: information, creative,
advertising, icon and performance. While not an exhaustive list of the possible
uses of the persona, they do cover much of the current territory. Definitional
space can be left for further growth to cover uses yet to be devised. A
corollary is an attempt to avoid "commercial" or "purposes of trade" in the
definitional structure, for all of the reasons repeatedly given above. Topics
whose treatment appears consistent across the different uses receive a general
definition. One such area is remedies, where I have accepted the generality of
the Restatement and gone it one better. One might just as well be hung for a
sheep as for a lamb.
In unifying the privacy-publicity divide, the subjective and largely
irrelevant distractions among "interests protected" and "types of harm" may
be ignored. They have not really helped in sorting out the law. They reflect
half-baked historical ideas, borrowed from pre-existing categories, which

306. See McCarthy, supra note 28, § 2.1; supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
307. See LANGDELL, supra note 19, at 58-122.
308. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some RealismAboutRealism-Respondingto Dean Pound, 44 HARV.
L. REv. 1222, 1255 (1931). A variant of this formulation appears in KARL N. LLEWELLYN,
JURISPRUDENCE, REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

73 (1962).
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provoked equally arbitrary counterreactions to fix. Although ubiquitous, they
are basically useless noise, and they can be happily discarded without much
affecting the desired results. If these notions have any place in the discussion,
it is in determining appropriate remedies, not up front in defining the contours
of the right itself.
Descendibility should be permitted for all rights in the identity, for
periods consistent with marketplace realities. Information and creative uses
will largely be permitted anyway, and when not permitted, then let the heirs
sue. The heirs may in reality be just as harmed as the original person
depicted." 9 On the indicia to be covered, the breadth of human ingenuity
should be respected, and the standards left flexible. In the end, it does boil
down to trusting judges and juries to make good decisions on these issues, as
the Pavesich court predicted. So far, the results reached by courts have
jusitified this confidence.
Finally, I believe that this is a clarifying and simplifying exercise and not
a generally improving one. Thus, my approach is to reproduce the most
common results under the current doctrine, rather than to "correct" them
according to my own notions of justice. °
With these factors in mind, I propose the following:
RESTATEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF IDENTITY

1. Every real person has a limited right to control the use and value of the
attributes of his or her personality and identity, to the extent hereafter set
forth.
2. In the case of uses in a news, biography, history, politics or other
factually informational context, such control shall apply only in cases of:
(a) the dissemination of actually false information, in the case of a
public figure, either with knowledge of the falsehood or with a
reckless disregard for the truth, or, in the case of a private figure,
with negligence as to its truth or falsehood;
(b) the dissemination of damaging information about a person that is so
hurtful, so intensely personal in nature, and so gratuitous and

309. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); ALDERMAN
& KENNEDY, supra note 28, at 176 et seq.

310. For instance, as a matter of personal conviction, I share the concern that the Reporters
expressed in the Foreword about the free speech implications of section 2(b) of my proposal. In
my reading, however, the courts have not always demonstrated a similar sensitivity. Perhaps I
should, in turn, be chided for a lack of boldness in failing to make substantive improvements,
particularly in light of my enthusiasm for making descriptive ones. A mandate for making
substantive improvements in Restatements can be claimed from the founding of the ALl. See
supra note 13 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, it is a mandate that I intentionally decline,
at least for the purpose of this exercise.
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inherently lacking in interest to the persons to whom it is communicated, as to shock the conscience of a civilized society.
In light of the importance of free debate and information exchange in a
democratic society, embodied in the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution, courts should grant relief grudgingly for uses of this
kind.
3. In the case of uses in a fictional or other creative context, such control
shall apply only to uses which:
(a) are not clearly identified, either explicitly or implicitly beyond
reasonable question, as fictional or other creative uses, (such a
disclaimer may be general in nature, provided it is clear); or
(b) even though so labeled, (i) so distort the person in question as to
render the presentation, taken as a whole, materially and harmfully
inconsistent with the basic nature of the person so depicted, and (ii)
are presented in a way that people will be likely to believe them to be
reflective of the truth, and not a parody, fantasy or humorous or
satirical use; or
(c) are so incidental to the overall thrust of the work within which the use
occurs as to constitute, in fact, an advertising use, icon use or
performance use under sections 4, 5, and 6, respectively, below.
4. In the case of advertising uses, including endorsement and other forms of
association with goods and services not constituting the identity itself,
such control shall extend broadly. Such control shall not apply to
advertising which directly promotes a use otherwise permitted under this
Restatement or to advertising which more generally promotes the specific
medium of information through which such permitted use is made.
5. In the case of icon uses, such control shall extend broadly, but not to uses
in which the information or creative component of the use predominates
over the icon use.
6. In the case of the use of a person's performance, such control shall extend
broadly, but not:
(a) to uses in which the information or creative component of the use
predominates over the performance, or
(b) to "fair uses," the existence of which shall turn on factors similar to
those applicable to the fair use of a copyrighted work.
7. The attributes of identity subject to control shall include the name,
nickname, or other generally used verbal or written identifier, the visual
or vocal likeness, including those created by look-alikes or sound-alikes,
and such other attributes which taken together and in the context of their
use would lead knowledgeable persons hearing, seeing or otherwise
experiencing such attributes reasonably and positively to identify the
person whose attributes are being used. The intent of a user to establish
,an association with the person shall be evidence in favor of such an
identification being made.
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8.

In the case of any use of identity subject to control hereunder made
without consent or license, the injured party may seek equitable relief,
including injunctions, and monetary damages, including punitive damages,
for harms of all recognized kinds, including personal distress and
monetary loss. The award of any such relief shall be made when
appropriate, in light of the general principles of law applicable to the
selection of remedies and the totality of the facts in the specific case.
9. Consent by a person to a use otherwise subject to control hereunder shall
be a complete defense for such use. Consent may either be explicit, as in
a signed writing or public declaration, or may be implied from deliberate
conduct which would be clearly inconsistent with a failure to have given
consent.
10. The control of an individual over his or her personality and identity
hereunder shall not terminate at such individual's death, but shall continue
to be exercised by any inter vivos transferees or, in the absence of such
an inter vivos transfer, by the legatees or heirs of the individual. The
duration of such rights shall either be set by statute, or shall continue as
long as there is sufficient value in the particular identity used to have
caused an intentional appropriation by the user.
11. The control of an individual over his or her personality and identity may
be licensed, assigned or otherwise transferred, in whole or in part, to
another entity. Any such transfer of the right to control must be made
explicitly by a signed writing. The transferee shall have all of the rights
of enforcement and relief with respect to the rights transferred which the
person whose rights were transferred would otherwise have had.
12. Although additional categories of control shall not be added lightly, with
the inevitable changes of society and its uses, the need for such additional
control may become manifest, and additional categories may be added by
legislation or judicial recognition.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The sections on publicity in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
have not fully accomplished the goals set out by the ALI for bringing
simplicity and clarity to the law. Rather, they have continued many of the old
sources of confusion, most notably the largely artificial distinction between
privacy and publicity, the confusing use of "commercial" and "for purposes
of trade" as operative terms, and the lingering baggage of a tort approach.
This effort, therefore, is unlikely to be the last word in the ongoing process
of describing the law of privacy and publicity. Perhaps the states will act,31'

311. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 166 (discussingthe need for a right of publicity statute in the
state of New York).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1996

73

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:709

3 12
or perhaps there will at long last be federal legislation in the area.
Whatever the next step, courts, legislators and commentators should feel free
to "go fish" for new approaches and formulations that can explain this area of
the law with ever increasing simplicity and clarity.

312. See McCarthy Speech, supra note 269, at 141-42; J. Eugene Salomon, Jr., Note, The
Right of PublicityRun Riot: The Casefor a Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179 (1987).
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